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ABSTRACT

Not long ago, there was a consensus in the legal academy
that the Japanese were irrationallitigants.As the theory went,
Japanese people would forgo litigating for financial gain
because of a cultural obsession with maintaining social
harmony. Based on this theory, it made perfect (but
economically irrational) sense that Japanese shareholders let
their U.S.-transplanted derivative action lay moribund for
almost four post-war decades, while at the same time the
derivative action was a staple of shareholder litigation in the
United States.
The 1980s brought a wave of law and economics to the
scholarship of Japanese law, which largely discredited the
cultural explanation for Japan's (economically irrational)
reluctant litigant. In this new academic era, reasonable minds
could disagree as to whether the efficiency of settlement or high
cost of litigation explained the dearth of litigation in Japan.
However, the assumption that the Japanese litigant was
economically motivated and rational (i.e., that they would
litigate only when the financial benefit from doing so exceeded
the cost) was virtually beyond reproach.
In the early 1990s, the number of derivative actions in
Japan skyrocketed. Japanese shareholders suddenly found
themselves as strange bedfellows with their American
counterpartsas the only shareholdersof listed companies in the
world that utilized the derivative action on a regular basis. This
extraordinarychange in the behavior of Japanese shareholders
has largely been understood through the lens of the
economically motivated and rationalshareholderlitigant.
This Article challenges the assumption that the dramatic
increase in Japanesederivative actions can be understood solely
through the narrow lens of the economically motivated and
rational shareholder. Using original empirical and case study
evidence, this Article demonstrates that in Japan, neither
shareholders nor attorneys stand to gain significant financial
benefits from derivative actions. To the contrary, this Article
suggests that the non-economic motives (i.e., political and
environmental motives and veiled extortion) and irrational
behavior of Japanese shareholders, (i.e., the use of inaccurate
mental heuristics, self-serving bias, and herding behavior) are
criticalfor providing an accurate explanationfor one of the most
dramatic increases in shareholder litigation in recent times.
This revelation further suggests that the leading literature on
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shareholder litigation-which forms the basis for the current
understandingof shareholder litigationin the United States-is
flawed, as it overlooks the critically important role that noneconomic motives and irrational behavior play in driving
shareholderlawsuits.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Not long ago, there was a consensus in the legal academy that
the Japanese were irrational litigants. As the theory went, Japanese
people would forgo litigating for financial gain because of a cultural
obsession with maintaining social harmony.' Based on this theory, it

1.
In the 1960s, Takeyoshi Kawashima, a sociology of law expert at the
University of Tokyo, published his seminal article on the "culturally irrational"
Japanese litigant which-until it was later challenged in the 1980s-provided the
leading explanation for Japan's dearth of civil litigation. Takeyoshi Kawashima,
Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 41-72 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963). According to J. Mark
Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato, "[t]he classical explanation for low litigation levels in
Japan hinges on cultural differences ... . [I]n Japan litigation threatens a national
obsession with consensus and harmony ....
Even when financial gains are large [the
Japanese] sacrificed financial gain for social conformity." J. MARK RAMSEYER &
MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 91-92 (1999). According
to Mark West,
[T]hose scholars who have studied the Japanese legal system as a comparative
model have all too often resorted to simplistic cultural theories to explain
differences. The belief that Japanese people have a unique and inherent
aversion to litigation is remarkably pervasive among scholars and laypersons
in Japan, and for that matter all over the world. It is widely believed that the
Japanese dislike conflict, strive to maintain group cohesiveness, and above all
avoid any action that might disturb that mysterious, peculiarly Japanese
concept of wa, or harmony.
Mark D. West, The Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions in Japan and the United
States, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1436, 1439-40 (1994) [hereinafter West, Pricing of
Shareholder Derivative Actions] (citations omitted). See generally YOSlYUKI NODA, AN
INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 165-66 (Anthony Angelo trans., 1976); Bruce E.
Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate Governance:
Evidence from the DaiwaBank ShareholderDerivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 11,
15-16 (2003) (discussing whether Japanese cultural values influence Japan's litigation
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made perfect (but economically irrational) sense that Japanese
shareholders let their U.S.-transplanted derivative action lay
moribund for almost four post-war decades while at the same time
the derivative action was a staple of shareholder litigation in the
2

United States.
The 1980s brought

a wave

of law

and economics

to the

scholarship of Japanese law, which largely discredited the cultural
explanation for Japan's (economically irrational) reluctant litigant. In
this new academic era, reasonable minds could disagree as to
whether the efficiency of settlement or high cost of litigation
explained the dearth of litigation in Japan. However, the assumption
that the Japanese litigant was economically motivated and rational
(i.e., as classical economic rational choice theory predicts that they
would litigate only when the financial benefit from doing so exceeded
3
the cost) was virtually beyond reproach.

rate); Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical
Analysis of Japan's Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 33-36 (2006) (discussing
cultural, institutional, and political explanations for low litigation rates in Japan).
See West, Pricing of ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 14372.
41 (discussing how the shareholder derivative suits remained relatively unused in
Japan for its first forty years and the predominant explanation was a theory of cultural
aversion to conflict); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without
Foundation?,7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 58 (1991) (discussing the history of shareholder
suits in the United States).
3.
In the 1980s, John Haley, Mark Ramseyer, and Takao Tanase each
developed theories that have evolved into the leading explanations for Japan's
historical dearth of civil litigation. Although each theory provides a different
explanation, they all assume that Japanese litigants are economically rational (i.e.,
that they ultimately decide whether to sue based on a narrow ex ante financial costbenefit analysis). See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 1, at 91-99 (analyzing data
from traffic accidents and concluding that economic analysis guides the legal decisions
of Japanese tort victims and their heirs); John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 366-67 (1978) (arguing that no evidence suggests
that Japanese parties will accept settlements less economically beneficial than the
anticipated economic gain from suit due to an aversion to lawsuits); Mark Ramseyer,
Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 14 J. JAPANESE STUD.
111, 111-18 (1988) (supporting the proposition that the Japanese are economically
rational litigants and discussing other reasons for the low litigation rate); Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict
Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 290 (1989) (discussing how Japanese societal
institutions shape financial incentives); Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes:
Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 651 (1990)
(discussing how nonconfrontational compensation systems influence Japanese
incentives to litigate). Tom Ginsburg and Glenn Hoetker's recent research on Japanese
civil litigation generally supports the common assumption of the economically rational
Japanese litigant. See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 56-57 (rejecting the
hypothesis that cultural factors play a major role in Japanese litigation rates and
concluding that the economic incentives for litigation are underexplored).
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In the early 1990s, the number of derivative actions in Japan
skyrocketed. 4 Japanese shareholders suddenly found themselves as
strange bedfellows with their American counterparts as the only
shareholders of listed companies in the world that utilized the
derivative action on a regular basis.5 This extraordinary change in
the behavior of Japanese shareholders is largely understood through
the narrow lens of the economically motivated and rational
shareholder litigant. Specifically, a consensus has emerged that the
number of derivative actions has dramatically increased in Japan
because the exorbitant fee for filing a derivative action was largely
eliminated in 1993.6 As the theory goes, since 1993, economically

4.
Derivative actions are lawsuits normally brought by corporate shareholders
on behalf of the corporation asserting claims that the corporation has not pursued on
its own. Theoretically, the corporation (through the board of directors) should enforce
its own claims. However, in certain instances, especially in claims against corporate
management (in which there is often a conflict of interest), the corporation is unlikely
to act on its own. For this reason, many countries allow shareholders to sue on the
corporation's behalf to enforce its claim-which is normally related to a breach of
duties owed by directors to the company. From 1950 to 1985, in all of Japan, there was
on average less than one derivative action per year and not a single successful
derivative action. In 1986, the Mitsui Mining decision was Japan's first successful
derivative action. By the end of 1992, there were thirty-one derivative actions pending
before Japanese courts. In 1993, the number of derivative actions more than doubled
with eighty-four cases pending before Japanese courts. Shiro Kawashima & Susumu
Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested
Reforms, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 9, 17-18 (1997). From 1996 to 2009, there were over 1,000
derivative actions filed in Japan. For the complete unpublished statistics provided to
the Authors by the Supreme Court of Japan, see infra Appendix A, Table 1.
5.
See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside DirectorLiability Across
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1463 (2006) (discussing the growth in Japanese
derivative suits following the cut in filing fees and permitting recovery of U.S.-style
attorneys' fees); see also REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 175 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that the

United States has a high incidence of shareholder litigation and that shareholder
litigation is becoming more frequent in Japan); XIAONING Li, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 13, 303 (2007) (noting that derivative actions

play a major role in the United States, while in the United Kingdom and Germany they
are

rarely

applied);

ARAD

REISBERG,

DERIVATIVE

ACTIONS

AND

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE 223-28 (2007) (discussing that the United States has a higher rate of
derivative suits relative to other countries, and observing that Japanese shareholders
have brought more derivative suits in recent years).
6.
According to Tomotaka Fujita, a leading corporate law professor at Tokyo
University, "[A]lthough the small number of derivative actions has sometimes been
erroneously attributed to the general anti-litigation sentiment among the Japanese
people, the litigation fee became recognized as the real determining factor." Tomotaka
Fujita, Transformation of the Management Liability Regime in Japan in the Wake of
the 1993 Revision, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 16 (Hideki

Kanda et al. eds., 2008); see also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 174-75 ("'Mlodest
Japanese procedural reform sparked an explosion in derivative suits in the early
1990s .. "); REISBERG, supra note 5, at 225 (asserting that changes in Japanese law
in late 1993 made it easier to bring derivative suits); Aronson, supra note 1, at 24
(discussing the rise in derivative suits after a revision to the Commercial Code in 1993
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motivated and rational Japanese shareholders have utilized
derivative actions because the financial benefit of doing so has
exceeded the cost.
This Article challenges the assumption that the dramatic
increase in Japanese derivative actions can be understood solely
through the narrow lens of the economically motivated and rational
shareholder. Using original empirical and case study evidence, this
Article demonstrates that the norm in Japan is that neither
shareholders nor attorneys stand to gain significant direct financial
benefits from pursuing derivative actions. To the contrary, our
empirical evidence suggests that in most cases it is economically
irrational for shareholders and attorneys to pursue derivative actions
in Japan (i.e., the risk adjusted ex ante financial cost of pursing a
derivative action normally outweighs the direct financial benefit).
This finding gives rise to a conundrum: if it is normally economically
irrational to pursue derivative actions in Japan, how has Japan
become a world leader in derivative litigation?
This Article attempts to solve this conundrum by expanding the
narrow lens of classical economic rationality to consider the
possibility that non-economic motives and irrational behavior may
provide valuable insights into the dramatic increase in derivative
litigation in Japan. Our case study, empirical, and econometric
analyses demonstrate that social activists seeking political (noneconomic) benefits are the single largest force driving derivative
litigation in Japan. In addition, the sokaiya,7 which often have strong

reduced filing fees for derivative suits); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463
(discussing how growth in Japanese derivative suits began after Japan cut filing fees
and permitted the recovery of attorneys' fees); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm
Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2115 (2001) [hereinafter Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction]
(discussing the rise in shareholder derivative litigation after procedural barriers were
removed in 1993); Mark D. West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and
The United States: Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 783
(1999) [hereinafter West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion] (commenting that
investors only recently began using the shareholder derivative suit as a result of the
1993 Commercial Code amendment that reduced filing fees).
7.
According to Mark West,
Although sokaiya-literally 'general meeting operators'-take several forms, a
sokaiya typically is defined as a nominal shareholder who either attempts to
extort money from a company by threatening to disrupt its annual
shareholders' meeting or works for a company to suppress opposition at the
meeting. Surprisingly, Japanese executives pay sokaiya despite the fact that
payment can result in civil and criminal liability not only for sokaiya, but for
the executive as well.
West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion, supra note 6, at 767. It should be noted
that over the last fifteen years, various attempts to stop payments to sokaiya have been
made in Japan including: (a) a stronger attitude of the police against antisocial groups
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ties to the yakuza (Japanese mafia), have pursued a significant
number of derivative actions in Japan. We suggest that the sokaiya
are willing to engage in prima facie economically irrational derivative
actions because such litigation enhances their reputation for
extortion, which ultimately provides them with indirect economic
gains. These findings are important because most of the leading
literature on shareholder litigation erroneously assumes that
shareholders rationally decide to sue based solely on a narrow ex ante
analysis of the direct financial cost and benefit of bringing a
shareholder action.
We note that based on a wider definition of "rationality"-which
assumes that rational behavior is any behavior that increases an
actor's overall level of well-being-the reputational, indirecteconomic, and politically motivated derivative actions engaged in by
social activists and sokaiya would be seen as "rational." Behavioral
law and economics scholars normally rely on this wider, utilitymaximizing, definition of rationality which to date has received scant
attention in the shareholder litigation literature. This Article
demonstrates that the failure to integrate this wider view of
rationality into the shareholder litigation literature has led to a
myopic understanding of why shareholders sue because it neglects to
account for non-economic motives and thus fails to accurately explain
a significant portion of shareholder litigation in Japan (and, we
suspect, everywhere else).
Perhaps more interestingly, even based on a wider "utilitymaximizing" definition of rationality, a substantial portion of Japan's
derivative litigation remains inexplicable in that it appears to be

in Japanese society (including sokaiya); (b) more support by the police to defend
executives against sokaiya; and (c) changes in law to prohibit sokaiya behavior.
Perhaps, the most important legal change was the one made to the Commercial Code in
1997 which currently is Article 970 of Companies Act which provides as follows:
(1) When any one of the persons listed in Article 960(1)(iii) to (vi) or any
other employee of a Stock Company gives property benefits on the account of
such Stock Company or its Subsidiary Company in relation to the exercise of a
right of a shareholder, such person shall be punished by imprisonment with
work for not more than three years or a fine of not more than three million yen.
(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to a person who
has, knowingly, received the benefits set forth in that paragraph or caused such
benefits to be given to a third party. (3) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall
also apply to a person who has requested the person prescribed in that
paragraph to give to himlher or a third party the benefits set forth in that
paragraph on the account of a Stock Company or its Subsidiary Company in
relation to the exercise of a right of a shareholder.
Kaisha-h6 [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 970 (Japan), translated in
Companies Act (Part V, Part VI, Part VII and Part VIII), JAPANESE L. TRANSLATION
(Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law.
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driven by purely irrational behavior. Putting aside social activist and
sokaiya driven litigation, the remaining universe of derivative
litigation in Japan appears to be driven by shareholders and
attorneys engaging in "utility-decreasing" behavior that is against
their own self-interest. Such purely irrational behavior by
shareholder litigants and their attorneys has rarely been explored. In
an attempt to unravel this apparent mystery, we rely on wellestablished behavioral economics research and our empirical evidence
to provide a number of possible explanations (e.g., the use of
inaccurate mental heuristics, self-serving bias and herding behavior)
for these otherwise inexplicable shareholder suits. By doing so, we
demonstrate that an understanding of behavioral irrationality is
critical to provide an accurate explanation for one of the most
dramatic increases in shareholder litigation that the world has
experienced in recent times.
Ultimately, this Article advances the literature in three ways.
First, it provides an accurate picture of the forces that drive
derivative litigation (which is the primary form of shareholder
litigation) in the world's third largest economy. 8 Second, it suggests
that the leading literature on shareholder litigation is flawed because
it is based on an outdated definition of rationality and
underestimates the importance of non-economic motives and
irrational behavior as drivers of shareholder litigation.9 Third, it
suggests that the substantial body of literature that claims
economically motivated and rational lawyers drive derivative
litigation in the United States should be reexamined in light of the
evidence
that
non-economically
motivated
and
irrational
shareholders-as demonstrated in the case of Japan-have the
potential to dramatically influence the rate of shareholder
litigation.10

8.
In postwar-Japan there has been very little securities fraud litigation.
Also, Japan has no opt-out class action mechanism, and only since 1998 has its civil
procedure allowed for multiple plaintiffs to "opt-in" to an action. See MINJI SOSHOHO
[MINSOHO] [C. CIv. PRO.] 1896, art. 30, para. 3 (Japan), translated in Code of Civil
Procedure,

JAPANESE

L.

TRANSLATION

(Apr.

1,

2009),

http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law ("A person who shares common interests
with a plaintiff or defendant of a pending suit but who is not a party to the suit may
appoint that plaintiff or defendant as a party to stand as a plaintiff or defendant on
his/her behalf as well."); see also West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion, supra
note 6, at 783 ("Japan has no opt-out class action mechanism, and only since 1998 has
it had an 'option' action for multiple plaintiffs.").
9.
See infra Part II (analyzing current legal theory that relies on the
assumption of rationality in investor behavior).
10.
One of the leading articles which has often been cited to support this
argument is Romano, supra note 2, at 61-62 (presenting empirical results regarding
the low prospects for financial recovery for shareholder plaintiffs).
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The importance of these advancements in the literature is
heightened by the timing of this Article. In the last five years, China
and Germany, which are both civil law countries and rank in the
world's five largest economies, have reformed their corporate laws to
provide for a derivative action." As this Article will explain, some
features of Japan's litigation regime that are rooted in its civil law
tradition increase the cost of derivative actions and therefore, based
purely on a financial cost-benefit analysis, may make it economically
irrational for Japanese shareholders to sue. 12 To some extent, these
civil law features also exist in Germany and China, which suggests
that an accurate understanding of Japan's experience can provide
valuable insights into how the derivative action may develop in these
two critically important economies. In China's case, Japan's
experience can shed light on suggestions made by some pundits that
the derivative action, as a Western legal transplant, cannot take hold
in a society built on non-litigious "Asian values. ' 13 With respect to the
United States, the recent financial crisis has resulted in a dramatic
restructuring of market regulations and renewed oversight of private
shareholder litigation. 14 Japan's experience suggests that it would be

11.
The derivative action was only introduced into German corporate law as
the new Article 148 of the Stock Corporation Act in 2005 by the Law for Corporate
Integrity and the Reform of Shareholder Suits. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation
Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 1089, as amended by
Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegritdt und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts
[UMAG] [LaW for Corporate Integrity and Shareholder Suits], Sept. 22, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil 1 [BGBL. I] at 2802, § 148 (Ger.). The Chinese derivative
action was made available for the first time in 2006 under Article 152 of the Company
Law of the People's Republic of China (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa).
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) 2005 STANDING
COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 42 (China). For an overview of the derivative action
in Germany and China, see Li, supranote 5, at 193-301.
12.
See infra Part VI.
13.
Li, supra note 5, at 276-78 (discussing whether Chinese tradition with its
cultural distaste for litigation will have an effect on the application of the derivative
action in China); see also MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAw 217

(2008) (discussing how the use of derivative suits in China is growing despite
arguments that Chinese legal culture is not based on individual rights); Tan Lay Hong,
Corporate Governance Issues in PRC Companies, 21 COMP. L. 87, 92 (2000) ("China has
historically operated under a disciplinary (rather than a legal or adjudicative) system
which focuses on maintaining order, achieving common objectives rather than on
preserving individual rights.").
14.
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An
Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1752-53 (2010) (noting that the
recession has led to calls for reform from legal scholars and politicians); Daniel M.
Gallagher, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
SEC Reform After Dodd-Frank and the Financial Crisis (Dec. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech12011/spch121411dmg.htm (describing the SEC's work
and objectives for further regulation in the wake of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
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prudent for American legislators and the judiciary to consider the
potential significance of non-economic motives and irrational
behavior as important drivers of shareholder litigation when deciding
on how to structure and implement these reforms.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II highlights the flaw in the
assumption that shareholder litigants are economically motivated
and rational actors and describes how this flawed assumption forms
the foundation of the leading scholarship on derivative actions. Part
III explains how the evolution of the derivative action in Japan is
largely understood through the narrow lens of the economically
motivated and rational shareholder litigant, and sets out several
testable hypotheses to determine whether this view is accurate. Part
IV tests the hypotheses laid out in Part III against the extensive
empirical and case study data collected on Japanese derivative
actions and by doing so, demonstrates that a number of significant
empirical findings cannot be understood solely through the narrow
lens of the economically motivated and rational shareholder litigant.
Part V explains how non-economic motives are the primary driver of
derivative actions in Japan and draws on research from behavioral
law and economics to suggest a number of reasons that some
Japanese shareholders appear to be irrationally pursuing derivative
actions. Part VI concludes by suggesting some useful lessons that
Japan and other countries can gain from the realization that noneconomic motives and irrational behavior can play a significant role
in shareholder litigation.

II.

THE FLAWED ASSUMPTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED AND
RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER LITIGANT AND ITS
APPLICATION TO DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

A. The Theory of the Economically Motivated and Rational
Shareholder Litigant Is Fundamentally Flawed
When will shareholders sue? A seemingly logical assumption is
that shareholders will only sue when the financial benefit of suing
exceeds the cost. This assumption forms the foundation of almost all
domestic and comparative analyses that attempt to explain the forces
that drive shareholder litigation.1 Unfortunately, the assumption is
erroneous.

15.
See infra Part II.B (arguing that the theory of the economically motivated
and rational shareholder litigant forms the foundation of derivative actions
scholarship).
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The reason why the assumption is erroneous is simple.
Shareholders are human beings (or, in the case of corporate
shareholders, controlled by human beings), and human behavior is
not solely driven by rational decisions based on a financial costbenefit analysis. This may seem like common sense but, as is all too
often the case in academia, in trying to understand shareholder
litigation, academics have largely replaced common sense with high
theory.
In this instance, the high theory comes in the form of the
"rational choice theory," which is rooted in the classical law and
economics movement. According to classical rational choice theory,
human behavior is easily predictable, as all human decisions are
made rationally in a manner that will maximize the individual's
financial wealth.' 6 Apply classical rational choice theory to
shareholder litigation and it axiomatically follows that shareholders
will only sue when the financial benefit of suing exceeds the cost.
Outside the realm of shareholder litigation, it is obvious and well
documented that classical economic rational choice theory neither
accurately explains nor correctly predicts a significant amount of
human behavior. 17 Every day, millions of people explicitly act to
reduce (not maximize) their wealth by donating money to charity.
Every day, millions of people irrationally pour billions of dollars into

16.
In their watershed article, Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen explain that
there are many ways in which classical law and economics scholars define "rational
behavior." However, the most common definition used by neoclassical law and
economics scholars in the context of corporate law is premised on the idea of "wealth
maximization: that actors will attempt to maximize their financial well-being or
monetary situation." Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1051, 1066 (2000).
17.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1055-56 (noting that credible
experimental evidence show that individuals frequently act in ways that are
incompatible with the assumptions of rational choice theory); see also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165,
1169-70 (2003) (discussing how heuristics influence human choices); Herbert A. Simon,
Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations,69 AM. ECON REV. 493, 501-06
(1979) (discussing bounded rationality and the behavioral theory of the business firm);
Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1977); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 227-30
(1973) (discussing biases and the availability heuristics); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124,
1130 (1974) (discussing cognitive biases that stem from reliance on judgmental
heuristics); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality,59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1108-09
(2010) (discussing irrational decisions and cognitive biases in the context of class
actions). See generally JOHN M. DOWLING & YAP CHIN-FANG, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS
IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 19-106 (2007) (discussing bounded rationality, risk
aversion, heuristics, and other behavioral economics concepts that influence human
behavior).
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slot machines when they know these machines only pay out a portion
of the money that is poured into them. Every day, countless people
decide to spend their hard-earned money in a shop or restaurant, not
because they have actual knowledge that it provides the best value
for their money, but because it is full of customers. None of these
common behaviors would be predicted by the classical economic
rational choice theory, as they are not rational actions taken solely to
maximize the individual's financial wealth.
However, it is certain that these behaviors (and a litany of
others) regularly occur on an enormous scale, and the reason they
occur is far from a mystery. Each of these common behaviors has a
logical explanation supported by a plethora of research from cognitive
psychology. The philanthropist is likely driven by the altruistic (noneconomic) pleasure of supporting a cause in which she believes.' 8 The
gambler is likely driven by the self-serving bias or fallacy that she
will "beat the odds."'1 9 The consumer is likely relying on a tenuous
mental heuristic that the presence of many customers in a business
establishment ensures that the business provides optimal value for
20
money spent.
For more than a decade, numerous legal scholars have
acknowledged the shortcomings of classical economic rational choice
theory-a theory that has come to be seen by many as an outdated
relic of the Chicago school of economics. 21 This has led to the
development of the field of behavioral law and economics, which
incorporates research pioneered by cognitive psychology into the
classical rational choice theory to provide a more complete
explanation for how and why people respond to the law by
22
considering non-economic motives and irrational behavior.
However, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the classical rational
choice theory (which fails to properly account for non-economic
motives and irrational behavior) persists as the bedrock of almost all

18.
In their recent research, David Ribar and Mark Wilhelm found that
donations seem to be motivated by the joy of giving. David C. Ribar & Mark 0.
Wilhelm, Altruistic and Joy-of-Giving Motivations in CharitableBehavior, 110 J. POL.
ECON. 425 (2002). For an overview of the behavioral economics research on charitable
giving, see DOWLING & YAP, supra note 17, at 341-48.
19.
See DOWLING & YAP, supra note 17, at 36, 39, 346 (discussing gamblers'
tendencies to ignore statistical probabilities, make riskier decisions with their
winnings, and make economically irrational decisions in attempts to recover their
losses).
20.
See id. at 44 ("[C]onsumers are unwilling or do not have the time to search
for the lowest price.").
21.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1055-56 (illustrating that individuals
often act in ways that are incompatible with the traditional concept of rationality).
22.

See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000)

(using cognitive psychology and behavioral economics to analyze law by looking at how
people actually behave).
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leading literature on shareholder litigation, while the advancements
of behavioral law and economics are largely ignored. The literature
specifically focusing on shareholder derivative actions illustrates this
point.
B. The Theory of the Economically Motivated and Rational Litigant Is
the Foundationof DerivativeActions Scholarship
Over the past three decades, almost all of the definitive
publications analyzing derivative actions have relied on the
assumption that shareholders rationally decide whether to sue based
solely on an ex ante analysis of the financial costs and benefits of
pursuing a derivative action. In the 1980s, Daniel Fischel and
Michael Bradley, in their watershed article The Role of Liability
Rules and The Derivative Suit in Corporate Law, assume that the ex
ante evaluation of whether a derivative action is "a positive net value
project" axiomatically determines whether a derivative action will be
pursued. 23 In the 1990s, Roberta Romano, in her now iconic article
The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, similarly
assumes that shareholders rationally determine whether to bring
derivative actions based on an ex ante evaluation of "the cost of
bringing a lawsuit [versus] ...the shareholder-plaintiffs pro rata
benefits. '24 In the 2000s, Brian Cheffins and Bernard Black's awardwinning article, which analyzes how derivative actions in several
jurisdictions impact the liability of outside directors, concludes that
private shareholders normally only sue when it maximizes the
shareholder's "expected recovery, making due adjustments for time,
risk, and expense. ' 25 Most recently, Arad Reisberg, in his leading text
Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance, adeptly canvasses
almost every conceivable issue with respect to derivative actions, but
leaves the assumption that "a litigant will commence an action only
when the expected value of the litigation is equal to or greater than

23.
See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and
the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 271-72 (1986) ("If the action appears to be a positive net value
project because of the possible recovery of attorneys' fees, an attorney will pursue it
regardless of its effect on the value of the firm.").
Romano, supra note 2, at 55.
24.
25.
Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1476, It should be noted that although
Cheffins and Black assume that private shareholders normally only sue when the
direct financial benefit of litigation exceed the cost they do insightfully acknowledge
that the only real litigation risk that outside directors face is in rare situations where
idiosyncratic plaintiffs have the non-financial motive to "send a message" to directors.
In this respect, Cheffins and Black's important "send a message" litigation finding
supports our general argument that non-monetary factors must be understood to
accurately explain what drives shareholders to sue. Id. at 1465-69.
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zero" largely untouched. 26 In short, the assumption that economic
motives and rational behavior are the sole determinants of whether
shareholders will pursue derivative actions is the foundation upon
which the leading scholarship on derivative actions is built.
The principal prediction that flows from the assumption of the
economically motivated and rational shareholder litigant is that,
regardless of the jurisdiction, very few shareholders will pursue
derivative actions. This prediction is based on two general rules that
form the legal starting-point in every jurisdiction that provides
shareholders with a derivative action: (1) the shareholder pursuing a
derivative action is prima facie responsible for the financial cost of
pursuing the action (the "Shareholder Risk Rule"); and (2) if the
derivative action succeeds, any award flowing from the derivative
action will normally be made to the company-the consequence of
which is that a shareholder-plaintiff will only benefit from a
successful derivative action to the extent that the award to the
company causes an increase in the value of the shareholder-plaintiffs
shares (the "Shareholder Benefit Rule").2 7 The logical implication of
these two universal rules is that economically motivated and rational
shareholders will only pursue a derivative action if, based on an ex
ante cost-benefit analysis, the financial cost of pursuing a derivative
action is less than the expected increase in the value of the
shareholder-plaintiffs shares should the action succeed.
Considering the high cost of derivative litigation and the small
stake that most shareholders own in companies, such a cost-benefit
analysis leads to the conclusion that it normally will be economically
irrational for a shareholder to pursue a derivative action, even when
a successful result is guaranteed. 28 This is particularly true in the
case of shareholders of listed companies, as they normally own a
miniscule percentage of the listed company's shares and the liquidity
of listed shares often makes exit a cost-effective substitute for
derivative litigation. Once you factor in the high probability that the
derivative action will fail in court, 29 the obvious prediction is that in
all jurisdictions derivative actions will be scarce, particularly in listed
companies.
Historically, this prediction is generally correct. In spite of the
availability of derivative actions in virtually all common law and

26.
REISBERG, supranote 5, at 224.
27.
LI, supra note 5, at 5-6; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 222-23.
28.
LI, supra note 5, at 5-6; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 222 (discussing how
free riders, a lack of direct remedy, and other factors normally make it economically
irrational for a shareholder to pursue derivative suits); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5,
at 1463 (discussing procedural factors and practical considerations that deter
shareholders from litigating claims).
29.
Romano, supra note 2, at 60.
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many civil law countries, derivative litigation is an infrequent affair
worldwide-particularly in the case of listed companies. 30 This dearth
in derivative litigation has persisted in the face of facilitative
corporate law reforms that have seen a number of common law
jurisdictions codify their derivative actions law and the recent
introduction of the derivative action in two of the world's largest
economies. 31 The most commonly cited exception to the global paucity
of derivative litigation is the United States, where historically
derivative actions have been pursued far more frequently than in any
32
other country.
There is considerable academic debate over whether the
relatively high rate of derivative litigation in the United States has
been a boon or bust for American corporate governance.33 However,

30.
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175 (discussing how derivative litigation
is available but rarely used in many countries); LI, supra note 5, at 5-6 (discussing the
weak economic incentives that shareholders normally have to pursue derivative actions
and why very few derivative actions are brought in most jurisdictions except for in the
US); REISBERG, supra note 5, at 222 (discussing how derivative litigation is rarely
rational for shareholders); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463 ("[A] combination of
loser pays rules, lack of scope for lawyers to claim attorneys' fees, and the company's
right of recovery make shareholders reluctant to step forward."); William Kaplan &
Bruce Elwood, The Derivative Action: A Shareholder's "Bleak House"?, 36 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 443, 444 (2003) (discussing procedural and practical deficiencies of
derivative suits); Lang Thai, How Popular Are Statutory Derivative Actions in
Australia? Comparison with United States, Canadaand New Zehland, 30 AUSTL. Bus.
L. REV. 118, 123 (2002) (discussing the relative dearth of derivative actions in
Australia, Canada and New Zealand compared to the United States).
31.
See Harald Baum & Dan W. Puchniak, The Derivative Action: An
Economic, Historical and Practice Oriented Approach, in THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN
AsIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2012); Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, Pathway to Minority
Shareholder Protection: Derivative Action in the People's Republic of China, in THE
DERIVATIVE ACTION IN AsiA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, supra; Dan
W. Puchniak, The Complexity of Derivative Actions in Asia: An Inconvenient Truth, in
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, supra.

32.
LI, supra note 5, at 13 (citing that the derivative action is more popular in
the United States than in any other country); KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175
(citing higher incidence of shareholder litigation in the United States); REISBERG,
supra note 5, at 224, 228 (noting the commonality of derivative suits in the United
States); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1462-63 (discussing how procedural
differences in the United States lead to more derivative actions compared to other
countries); Thai, supra note 30, at 123.
33.
John Coffee and Donald Schwartz have argued that derivative actions in
the United States play an important role in deterring directors from breaching their
duties and punishing breaches. John C. Coffee & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of
the Derivative Suit: An Evaluationand a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 261, 302-09 (1981). Conversely, Roberta Romano has argued that the principal
beneficiaries of the derivative litigation appear to be attorneys who benefit from fees
generated through quick settlements with directors under their D&O liability
insurance coverage-while at the same time providing shareholders with no obvious
gains. Romano, supra note 2, at 57, 84. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, have
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there is little disagreement that the reason the United States has
historically had a relatively high rate of derivative litigation is
because of unique features in its derivative actions regime which tip
the financial cost-benefit analysis in favor of pursuing derivative
actions. 34 This consensus in the literature has reinforced the
assumption that rational decision making based purely on financial
cost-benefit considerations is the primary determinant of whether
derivative actions will be pursued.
The characteristic of America's derivative actions regime that is
most often credited with uniquely tipping the financial cost-benefit
analysis in favor of pursuing derivative actions is the pervasiveness
of contingency fee agreements.3 5 Almost all derivative litigation
involving listed companies in the United States is conducted under
contingency fee agreements (which traditionally have been either not
allowed or heavily restricted in most other countries), rendering

provided a counter to Romano's argument by suggesting that "strike suit litigation is
relatively uncommon." They argue that defendants, as repeat players in shareholder
litigation, are unlikely to settle suits because that would merely make them the target
of more strike suits in the future and plaintiffs' attorneys are also unlikely to bring
strike suits due to their substantial economic risks. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in Class and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 78 (1991). For a more
recent evaluation of the effect of derivative actions on American corporate governance,
see LI, supra note 5, at 121-25; Erickson, supra note 14, at 1752-55 (discussing
whether derivative actions are being replaced by more modern methods such as
securities class actions, government investigations, and listing standards of national
stock exchanges).
34.
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175 ("The higher incidence of
shareholder litigation in the United States is best explained by the presence of a
specialized plaintiffs' bar that emerged out of a unique combination of contingent fees,
discovery mechanisms, pleading rules, generous attorney's fee awards, and the absence
of the 'loser pays' rule."); REiSBERG, supra note 5, at 223-28 (arguing that the existence
of common funds and contingency fee arrangements contribute to the high incidence of
derivative suits in the United States); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1462-63
(stating that more shareholder derivative actions are pursued in the United States
because of no Loser Pays Rule and the permissibility of contingency fees).
See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor Protection:
35.
Economic Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 169, 184-85 (2004)
[hereinafter Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations] ("This U.S. 'private attorney general'
model rests on procedural rules that establish fee arrangements for plaintiffs'
attorneys."); see also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175 (asserting that
contingency fees are one reason that the United States has higher rates of derivative
litigation); REISBERG, supra note 6, at 226-28 (discussing how contingency fees
contribute to the relatively high rates of derivative suits in the United States); SIEMS,
supra note 13, at 212 (noting the decreased financial risks for shareholders bringing
derivative suits because of contingency fees, since no lawyers' fees arise if the suit is
unsuccessful); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1393-94 (arguing that the United
States has more derivative suits compared to many other countries because in the
United States plaintiffs' attorneys are entrepreneurs who seek out legal violations
rather than waiting passively for litigants to come to them).
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nugatory the chilling effect of the Shareholder Risk and Benefit
36
Rules.
In standard contingency fee agreements, the shareholder and
attorney agree that the attorney will assume the financial cost of
pursuing the derivative action and will only be compensated on a
fixed percentage of the amount recovered should the derivative action
be successfully litigated or settled. 37 Such agreements shift the
financial risk of pursuing a derivative action from the shareholderplaintiff to the attorney, but still allow the shareholder-plaintiff to
benefit according to the Shareholder Benefit Rule.3 8 By creating an
arrangement in which shareholder-plaintiffs have no direct downside
financial risk and obvious potential financial gain, the U.S.
contingency fee system provides economically motivated and rational
shareholders with a strong incentive to take part in derivative
litigation. However, shifting the risk to attorneys logically raises
another related and critically important question: why do American
attorneys enter into contingency fee agreements to pursue derivative
actions, assuming they are also economically motivated and rational?
From an economic rational choice perspective, there are three
primary reasons that American attorneys retained under contingency
fee agreements are considerably better positioned than shareholders
to accept the financial risk of pursuing derivative actions. First,
attorneys compensated under contingency fee agreements can be
almost certain that if they successfully litigate or settle a derivative
action, their financial risk will be rewarded because of the "common
fund doctrine" developed by U.S. courts. 39 According to this doctrine,
when there is a monetary award or settlement resulting from a
derivative action, it is paid into a common fund. 40 The contingency fee
that the attorney agrees to with the shareholder-plaintiff (normally
20 to 30 percent of the amount recovered) is treated as a first charge
on the common fund.4 1 This contrasts starkly with the Shareholder

36.
See REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226-28 (discussing how attorneys' fees are
contingent on the case being successfully litigated or on settlement of the case thus
lowering risk for plaintiffs); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1398, 1405-06, 1427-28,
1435, 1455, 1461 (noting contingency fee agreements in shareholder suits, while
permitted in the United States, are restricted in countries such as the United Kingdom
and Australia, and are prohibited in other countries, including Germany, France, and
formerly Japan).
37.
For a detailed consideration of the U.S. contingency fee system, see
generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).

LI, supra note 5, at 178.
38.
39.
Id. at 177; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 227.
40.
REISBERG, supra note 5, at 227.
41.
Id. For an in-depth discussion of the common fund doctrine, see Carol G.
Hammett, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit
Rule Reexamined, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 164 (1972).
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Benefit Rule which, as explained above, normally limits the benefit
for shareholder-plaintiffs to the potential increase in the value of
their shares. 4 2 Thus, shareholder-plaintiffs face considerably more
risk than American attorneys when they choose to accept the
financial burden of derivative litigation-which is normally why they
do not. Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that when a U.S.
derivative action succeeds, there is normally no significant increase
in the relevant listed company's share price and therefore, no
financial benefit to the shareholders. 43 However, in such successful
derivative actions attorneys often receive millions of dollars in
contingency fees from the common fund, which justifies their risk for
44
pursuing derivative actions.
Second, U.S. courts normally allow attorneys to receive
contingency fees in derivative actions when the company does not
receive tangible monetary relief, but nevertheless is deemed to
"substantially benefit" from the litigation. 45 This is an exception to
the general contingency fee rule that normally limits the payment of
contingency fees to tangible relief.46 The "substantial benefit"
doctrine is a boon for attorneys, as empirical evidence suggests that
non-monetary relief is commonly the end result of U.S. derivative
litigation. 47 In most circumstances, economically motivated and

42.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43.
In Romano's oft-cited event study she found no statistically significant
change in a company's stock price when a derivative action settles. As very few
derivative actions succeed at trial and most settle, a settlement is the most likely way
in which shareholder-plaintiffs succeed in U.S. derivative actions. Romano suggests
that the reason for the insignificant result is likely because of the typically minimal
value of derivative action settlements. Romano, supra note 2, at 67.
44.
See id. at 69 (showing the development of attorneys' fees in shareholder
suit payouts over time); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 541 (1991)
(discussing methods of payment for plaintiffs' attorneys).
45.
In such cases, attorneys receive contingency fees not on a percentage basis
from the common fund but based on the "lodestar method" from the benefiting
company. A "substantial benefit" may include the nullification of an election of
directors, cancellation of a disadvantageous contract or transaction, obtaining an
injunction against mismanagement, or making some procedural changes. JAMES D.
Cox & THOMAS L. HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 466-67 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the "substantial
benefit" requirement and potential recoveries that satisfy the requirement); DEBORAH
A. DEMOrr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 6:15 (2003)
(detailing the requirement that the plaintiffs actions provide some tangible benefit for
the corporation, usually pecuniary benefit); see also, LI, supra note 5, at 177; REISBERG,
supra note 5, at 227 (discussing how "substantial benefit" to the corporation can result
from judgments or settlements); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1394 (noting that
corporations will generally pay plaintiffs attorneys' fees if the settlement agreement
recites that the suit has conferred "substantial benefit" on the corporation).
46.
REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226-27.
See Romano, supra note 2, at 61 (noting that only around 50 percent of
47.
settlements result in a monetary recovery).
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rational shareholders are especially unlikely to accept the financial
risk of derivative litigation to pursue non-monetary relief as such
relief further decreases the likelihood that shareholder plaintiffs will
48
benefit through an increase in the value of their shares.
Third, directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance promotes
quick settlements in derivative actions, making them extremely
attractive for attorneys compensated under contingency fee
agreements.4 9 Obviously, the less time a contingency fee attorney
spends on a given action, the lower the opportunity cost is for
pursuing that action. In addition, settling under D&O liability
insurance avoids the risk of a director not having the financial
resources to satisfy a judgment at trial and of the attorney receiving
nothing in an unsuccessful trial. 50 The incentive for directordefendants to quickly settle a derivative claim dovetails with that of
contingency fee attorneys. Director-defendants benefit from quick
settlements because they can ensure that such settlements fall within
the scope of their D&O insurance (normally purchased for them by
the company) 51 and thus avoid the risk of being held personally liable
at trial. 52 Additionally, the quicker a director-defendant can settle an
action, the less negative publicity she will likely suffer. 53 Some
academics argue that in spite of their popularity, such quick
settlements do not benefit the long-term performance of U.S.
companies, as they increase the cost of D&O liability insurance which
is ultimately passed onto shareholders. 54 Regardless of whether this

48.
Id. at 63 (stating that structural settlements in shareholder suits seem to
provide inconsequential gains).
49.
DEMOTT, supra note 45, § 6:3; LI, supra note 5, at 179 (discussing directors'
incentives to settle as a possible conflict of interest).
50.
See Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1396 (noting that directors' personal
assets are not a part of settlements funded by D&O coverage); Romano, supra note 2,
at 57 (arguing that litigation introduces the risk of personal liability for the defendant
and the risk of no attorneys' fees for plaintiffs' counsel, giving both powerful incentive
to settle).
51.
See Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1396 (discussing how companies
purchase D&O insurance to cover litigation expenses, settlement funds, and directors'
liability); Romano, supra note 2, at 57 ("[A]Ill states permit corporations to purchase
D&O liability insurance for their executives, and policies can cover losses that cannot
be indemnified.").
52.
See Romano, supra note 2, at 57 ("For an individual defendant, a
settlement entails no personal expenditures, while if the claim is litigated, there is
some probability, however small, of being liable with no reimbursement.").
53.
There are two reasons for this: (1) protracted litigation is likely to attract
more media attention; and (2) in a court approved settlement other shareholders are
estopped from brining a similar claim which would likely have negative financial and
publicity effects. Id. at 57 n.1.
54.
See id. at 57 ("A corporation's insurance premium may well rise following a
lawsuit, but this cost is borne by all of the shareholders, rather than the litigating
parties.").
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normative claim is correct, the potential for quick settlements clearly
provides an additional powerful incentive for economically motivated
and rational American attorneys to pursue derivative actions.
In addition to the "game-changing" effect of the U.S. contingency
fee system, there are a number of other unique features of the
American derivative action regime that have historically tipped the
financial cost-benefit analysis in favor of pursuing derivative actions.
The general rule in U.S. litigation is that each party is responsible for
its own litigation costs. 55 In most other countries, the opposite rule
applies: the losing party is required to pay a portion of the successful
party's costs (the "Loser Pays Rule"). 56 From an economic rational
choice perspective, the absence of a Loser Pays Rule in the United
States is particularly important in incentivizing derivative
litigation.5 7 As explained above, it is normally economically irrational
for shareholders in derivative litigation to shoulder even their own
litigation costs, which makes derivative litigation in a Loser Pays
Rule system even more economically irrational. 58 In addition,
America's wide scope for pre-trial discovery and strict enforcement of
financial disclosure for listed companies reduces the potential cost of
pursuing derivative actions. 59 On the benefit side of the equation, the
prevalence of substantial D&O liability coverage in listed U.S.
companies provides "deep-pockets" to satisfy awards or settlements
resulting from derivative actions, while the relatively large damage
awards given by U.S. courts make it possible for economically

DEMOTT, supra note 45, § 6:3 (observing that a plaintiffs attorney will
55.
receive nothing unless the suit is successful or settles); LI, supra note 6, at 179;
REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226 ("In the US, the general rule is that each party is
responsible for his own attorney's fees."); Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1393
("[L]itigants in the U.S. pay their own legal expenses, regardless of whether they win
or lose in court.").

See Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1393 ("Other countries generally
56.
require the losing side to pay at least some of the successful party's legal costs, which
deters some claims.").
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175 (asserting that the absence of a
57.
Loser Pays Rule is one reason for the higher incidence of derivative litigation in the
United States); REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226; Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463
(discussing how a Loser Pays Rule deters shareholder suits).
See supra text accompanying notes 27-38.
58.
See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 175 (asserting that discovery
59.
mechanisms contribute to the higher incidence of derivative litigation in the United
States); West, Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1466-68
(discussing how securities laws regulating disclosure and discovery decrease the costs
of derivative actions in the United States by providing shareholders with mechanisms
to obtain relevant information).
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rational litigants to reach into the insurance company's "deeppockets."60
In sum, derivative action scholarship is premised on the
assumption that shareholders and attorneys are economically
motivated automatons that pursue derivative litigation rationally. As
the theory goes, they will only pursue a derivative action when the
financial benefit is greater than the cost.-This assumption is used to
explain both the global dearth in derivative actions and their
idiosyncratic frequency in the United States. The idea that
shareholders or attorneys driven by non-economic motives may
sometimes pursue derivative actions when the direct financial cost of
pursuing a derivative action clearly exceeds the financial benefit has
received scant attention in the literature. Similarly, the idea that the
shackles of bounded rationality may be causing shareholders or
attorneys to irrationally pursue derivative actions against their selfinterest has (to our knowledge) never been explored. From this
perspective, to claim that non-economic motives and irrational
behavior may actually be the main drivers of derivative litigation in
Japan, as this Article does in Part IV below, turns the current
scholarship on its head.

III. APPLYING THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED
AND RATIONAL SHAREHOLDER LITIGANT TO JAPAN

A. The Rational Explanation for the Absence of Shareholder
Litigation in Post-War Japan
Long before Commodore Perry's black ships arrived in Edo Bay
on July 8, 1853, Japan had a vibrant economy and sophisticated legal
system. 61 However, the arrival of the black ships sparked a chain of
events that resulted in Japan looking to the West to reform all
aspects of its society, including its legal system, during the Meiji Era
(1868-1926).62 During this period, the Japanese government adopted
the pillars of its current legal system by implementing a series of
codified laws modeled substantially on German Civil Law. 63 As part
of this monumental reform, the Diet passed the Commercial Code
(Law No. 49 of 1899), which was divided into five books. Book II
codified Japanese corporate law. From its enactment in 1893 until the

60.
Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1396, 1415, 1429, 1455, 1464, 1476; see
West, Pricing of ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1502 (detailing the
increase in Japanese companies provided D&O liability insurance).
61.
GERALD McALINN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW 2-8 (2007).
62.
Id. at 9.
63.
Id. at 10.
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new Company Law (Law 86 of 2005) went into effect on May 1, 2006,

Book II of the Commercial Code (the "Commercial Code") 64was the
primary piece of legislation governing corporations in Japan.
Considering its German roots, it is not surprising that the
original version of the Commercial Code did not contain a derivative
action. 6 5 Rather, the derivative action found its way into Japanese
corporate law following Japan's surrender in World War II when the
Allied Forces occupied the country.6 6 From 1946 to 1950, as part of a
larger effort of the American led forces to democratize Japan,
members of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)
worked with prominent Japanese legal scholars to revise the
Commercial Code. 6 7 In 1950, using American corporate law as a
model, Japan substantially reformed its corporate law to provide
several new shareholder protections. 68 This included reforms
268-3 of
permitting derivative actions, set out in Articles 267 through
69
the Commercial Code (the "Article 267 Derivative Action").
The establishment of the Article 267 Derivative Action was
regarded as one of the reform's most important features, as it
appeared to provide a formidable weapon to protect the rights of
minority shareholders. 70 Specifically, it allowed any shareholder who
held at least one share continuously for six months to demand that a
corporation act to enforce a director's duties.7 1 If the corporation

64.
2008).
65.

CCH JAPANESE BUSINESS LAw GUIDE 10-101, 10-510 (Luke Nottage ed.,
However, as Mark West notes,

a rather weak substitute [for the derivative
Before 1950, Japan had ....
action which it], borrowed from Germany during Japan's Meiji Period (18681926), by which shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of the capital of
the corporation could require the auditors of the corporation to bring suit
against directors. The mechanism was rarely used, perhaps because those
shareholders who held ten percent of a corporation's capital could enforce their
rights through informal means of control. In addition, sparsity of use may also
be attributed to strict rules regarding security for expenses and, as a further
deterrent, a provision that if the suit failed, shareholders would be liable for
damages to the company.
West, Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1444-45; see also
Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 13-14 (providing background of the
introduction of modern commercial law in Japan during the Meiji Period).
West, Pricingof Shareholder Derivative Actions, supranote 1, at 1444-46.
66.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.; see also Kawashima & Sakurai, supranote 4, at 14-15.
69.
SHOHO [COMM. C.] 1899, arts. 267-268(3) (Japan); Kawashima & Sakurai,
supra note 4, at 15.
Id. at 14; see also Lester N. Salwin, The New Commercial Code of Japan:
70.
Symbol of Gradual Progress Toward Democratic Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478, 487 (1962)
(describing Japan's modernization of its corporate law and the amendment permitting
derivative suits).
Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 15-16.
71.
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failed to act after thirty days, the shareholder had the right to initiate
72
an action against the director in the name of the company.
The drafters of Article 267 had two stated objectives. The first
objective was to provide an effective compensatory mechanism for
shareholders in circumstances where a director's breach of duties
injured the corporation (and therefore, indirectly, its shareholders),
but the corporation decided not to sue. 7 3 As in many other
jurisdictions, the drafters felt that such a compensatory mechanism
was necessary because often corporations decided not to sue a
wrongdoing director where the wrongdoing director either directly or
indirectly controlled the company.7 4 The second objective was to
improve the efficiency of Japanese corporate governance by providing
a mechanism to deter controlling directors from breaching their
duties by making them aware that they could no longer do so with
75
impunity.
Despite its lofty goals and American pedigree, the Article 267
Derivative Action lay moribund for the first thirty-five years of its
existence. 76 In the five years following its enactment, there was not a
77
single court decision involving an Article 267 Derivative Action.
From 1950 to 1985, in all of Japan, there was on average less than
one derivative action per year and not a single successful derivative
action. 78 The comatose state of the Japanese derivative action stood
in stark contrast to its vibrant American ancestor. From the late
1960s to the late 1980s approximately 19 percent of U.S. public
corporations experienced a derivative action.7 9 Indeed, empirical
evidence suggests that significantly more derivative actions are
regularly filed in a single year in the state of Delaware alone than

72.
Shareholders could forgo the waiting period and act immediately in cases
where they could establish that the thirty day waiting period might cause the
corporation irreparable injury. Id. at 16. Under Article 847 of the new Company Act
2005 the waiting period has been extended to sixty days. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE
LAW 253 (3d ed. 2009); see also Kaisha-h5 [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 847
(Japan), translated in Companies Act (Part V, Part VI, Part VII and Part VIII),
JAPANESE L. TRANSLATION (Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtransiation.go.jp/law.
73.
Kawashima & Sakurai, supranote 4, at 15.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.

76.

Id. at 17.

77.

Id.

78.
According to Kawashima & Sakurai, "approximately twenty cases were
litigated between 1950 and 1985." Id.
79.
According to Romano's study that examined a random sample of 535 U.S.
public corporations between the late 1960s and 1987, 19 percent of these public
corporations experienced a derivative suit-some of them on several occasions.
Romano, supra note 2, at 58-59.
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were cumulatively filed during the first thirty-five years in post-war
Japan.8 0
Initially, as if possessed by the infamous Kipling quote, "Oh,
East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,"8 1
several Japanese and foreign comparative law scholars viewed the
enormous disparity between the rate of derivative actions in the
United States and Japan as perfectly natural.8 2 While academics
appeared (and still appear) fervently to cling to the assumption of the
economically rational Western shareholder litigant, under the guise of
Japan's "mysterious" Confucian culture they were (and sometimes
still are) quick to blindly embrace the inherent "cultural irrationality"
of Japanese shareholder litigants.8 3 To these academics, it made
perfect (but economically irrational) sense that Japanese
shareholders would forgo bringing derivative actions for financial
gain because of their cultural obsession with maintaining social
harmony.8 4 As the theory went, it was only natural that irrational
wa-seeking (harmony-seeking) Japanese shareholders would let their
U.S. transplanted derivative action lay moribund for almost four

80.
The estimates vary on the number of derivative actions filed per year in
Delaware. Two recent studies suggest that approximately forty derivative actions are
filed per year in the state of Delaware. Randall Thomas and Robert Thompson found
that in 1999 and 2000 approximately forty derivative suits per year were filed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public
and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1762 (2004).
Similarly, Kenneth Davis found about 294 suits filed over more than seven years or
about forty suits filed per year. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit,
61 VAND. L. REV. 387, 418 (2008). These numbers have led scholars to conclude that
"the number of derivative suits has declined markedly in recent years." Randall S.
Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 305 (2008). Even these reduced numbers
suggest that more derivative actions are filed in Delaware per year than were filed in
Japan during the three and a half decades between 1950 and 1985-during which time
there were approximately twenty actions. Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17.
81.
RUDYARD KIPLING, THE BALLAD OF EAST AND WEST (1889), reprinted in 10
THE WORKS OF RUDYARD KIPLING 66 (Echo Library ed., 2012).

According to West, "explaining away low derivative litigation rates in
82.
Japan is quick and easy if they can be attributed to cultural values without
undertaking a substantive analysis, or if culture is used to explain away all differences
for which one cannot find other explanations. The cultural explanation permeates the
logic of scholars both within and outside Japan." West, Pricing of Shareholder
Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1440; see also Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at
33 (explaining that many think the Japanese litigate less than other advanced nations
as a matter of cultural preference).
For examples of academics clinging to the idea of the rational Western
83.
shareholder litigant, see infra Part J.B. For past and current accounts of Japanese
culture being cited as an important potential factor in determining Japan's rate of
shareholder litigation, see West, Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note
1, at 1439-40; see also REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226; SIEMS, supranote 13, at 216-17.
84.
West, Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1439-40.
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post-war decades, while at the same time it was a staple of
85
economically rational shareholder litigation in the United States.
The 1980s brought a wave of law and economics to the
scholarship of Japanese law which largely discredited the cultural
explanation for Japan's economically irrational reluctant litigant.
John Haley, in his now classic article The Myth of the Reluctant
Litigant, began the assault on the cultural theory by providing
evidence that at certain times in Japanese history, such as the
interwar period (1918-1939), litigation rates in Japan were high. 86
Based on this fact alone, the previously watertight assertion that
ancient Japanese culture was solely responsible for Japan's low rate
of litigation became porous. In a series of articles that followed, Mark
Ramseyer poked more holes in the cultural theory, including the
succinct, but powerful claim that the cultural theory was little more
than a tautology.8 7 He correctly observed that citing Japan's low rate
of litigation as evidence of its non-litigious culture and then claiming
that Japan's non-litigious culture explains its low rate of litigation
was not "terribly informative."8 8 Such obvious defects in the cultural
theory rapidly made it cannon fodder for any academic looking to
publish another article.
Haley and Ramseyer were quick to fill the academic void left by
the largely debunked cultural theory. Haley suggested that Japan's
dearth in litigation was caused by its costly and inefficient legal
system.8 9 As his theory goes, economically rational potential
Japanese litigants more often resolved their disputes out of court
90
because it is less costly and more efficient than litigation in Japan.
Ramseyer countered Haley's thesis by suggesting that it was the
economic efficiency (not the inefficiency) of Japan's legal system that

85.
Id.
86.
See generally Haley, supra note 3. Haley is not normally described as being
part of the law and economics tradition. However, his view of Japanese shareholders as
economically rational actors illustrates how his thinking at the time was influenced by
the classical rational choice theory.
87.
J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement and Institutional Barriersto Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 607
(1985); see Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 34-35 (discussing Ramseyer's theory
on the lack of litigation in Japan).
88.
Ramseyer, supra note 87, at 607. Ramseyer disagreed with the way in
which the cultural theory was presented. However, he posited a new theory in his
article based upon the interconnection between Japan's non-litigious ethos and
institutional barriers to litigation. Id. at 609-12.
89.
Haley, supra note 3, at 378-89; see Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 34
(discussing Haley's perspective).
90.
Haley, supra note 3, at 389-90.
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explained its dearth of litigation. 91 He argued that unique features of
92
Japan's legal system made its court decisions extremely predictable.
Therefore, economically rational potential litigants normally decided
not to litigate because, based on a financial cost-benefit analysis, it is
economically irrational to litigate when both parties can accurately
anticipate the court's decision. 9 3 Takao Tanase, a highly respected
Japanese legal scholar, disagreed with both Haley and Ramseyer. He
suggested that Japan's political elite, in an effort to keep disputes out
of court, provided a number of alternative forums for dispute
resolution, making it economically irrational for most potential
94
Japanese litigants to resolve their disputes through the courts.
Although several decades have passed, preeminent legal scholars
still grapple with determining which one of these three leading, yet
incongruent, theories most accurately explains the historical paucity
of litigation in Japan. 95 However, what has been sorely overlooked in
the literature is that these three ostensibly diametrically opposed
theories are in fact premised on the same fundamentally flawed
assumption-that potential litigants rationally decide whether to sue
based purely on an ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis.9 6 In short,
in responding to the obvious logical flaws in the debunked cultural
theory, these three prominent scholars inadvertently introduced a
more subtle flaw into Japanese legal scholarship: the assumption of
the economically motivated and rational litigant.
Not long after Haley, Ramseyer, and Tanase's debate, their blind
assumption of the economically motivated and rational shareholder
litigant seeped into the scholarship of Japanese derivative actions.
Mark West, in his watershed 1994 article, The Pricingof Shareholder
Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, not only accepts
the assumption of the economically motivated and rational litigant,

91.
RAMSEYER & NAKAzATO, supra note 1, at 93-94 (noting the predictability of
Japan's unique institutional features makes settlement more likely); see Ginsburg &
Hoetker, supranote 1, at 34-35 (explaining Ramseyer's perspective).
92.
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 1, at 94; see Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra
note 1, at 34-35 (explaining Ramseyer and Nakazato's view of the unique features in
the Japanese legal system).
93.
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 1, at 92-93.
94.
Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident
Compensation in Japan,24 LAW & SOCY REV. 651, 679-87 (1990).

95.
See Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 52-57 (discussing the three
leading theories on the issue).
96.
According to Ginsburg and Hoetker, their analysis suggests "that both
procedural incentives to litigate and attorney availability matter, and matter a good
deal, relative to other institutional factors. Perhaps more important, however, are
underexplored relationships between the economy and litigation." Id. at 14-15. Their
conclusion essentially conforms to the approach of using the classical economic lens of
the rational litigant to understand litigation in Japan.
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but emphatically embraces it. 97 West boldly asserts that "viewing the
Japanese litigant as a rational entity subject to economic incentives"
is required for properly understanding derivative litigation in
Japan.9 8 Indeed, West's reasoning reads like a page out of a classical
economic rational choice theory textbook. As he explains,
"[S]hareholders make decisions regarding derivative litigation just as
they make any other decision: add up the [financial] benefits, deduct
the costs, and if the result is positive after factoring in individual
preferred levels of risk, bring suit."9 9
The specific legal features that West highlights to explain the
historical paucity of derivative litigation in post-war Japan are
familiar. West essentially recites all of the primary reasons (outlined
above) that in most jurisdictions-with the notable exception of the
United States-derivative litigation is normally economically
irrational. Specifically, he notes that under Japan's post-war
derivative actions regime: (1) shareholders were prima facie
responsible for the cost of derivative litigation but only stood to
benefit pro rata through the potential increase in the value of their
shares (i.e., Japan applied the Shareholder Cost and Benefit
Rules); ° ° (2) the rules governing attorneys' fees required the
payment of a fee prior to litigation-eliminating the possibility of a
U.S.-style contingency fee system;1 0 1 (3) a "Loser Pays Rule" for
litigation generally required the losing party to pay the successful
party's court costs; 10 2 (4) weak pre-trial discovery rights and lax
enforcement of corporate financial disclosure increased the cost of
derivative litigation; 0 3 and (5) the absence of D&O liability coverage
and modest court awards limited the potential benefits of derivative

97.
West, Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1.
98.
Id. at 1507.
99.
Id. at 1456-57. West goes on to argue that "it is simply unnecessary to
invent makeshift cultural arguments when a more accurate, rational, economic
explanation is readily available." Id. at 1507.
100.
Id. at 1456-57.
101.
According to West,
[I]n the United States, high attorneys' fees charged on a contingency basis
encourage attorneys to seek out potential derivative suit plaintiffs. In effect,
the benefit to attorneys makes up for the low recoverable damages. In Japan,
however, the rules regarding attorneys' fees makes such fees a cost that affects
both shareholders and attorneys. Because attorneys' fees must be paid before
the litigation begins, and reimbursement by the corporation even to successful
plaintiffs is questionable, shareholders have little incentive to bring suit.
Japanese attorneys are likewise discouraged from undertaking derivative
litigation because other forms of litigation are at least as profitable.
Id. at 1456-57.
102.
Id. at 1463.
103.
Id. at 1466.
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litigation. 10 4 In short, in post-war Japan, similar to most other
countries (except for the United States), the Shareholder Cost and
Benefit Rules normally made derivative actions prima facie

economically irrational and the absence of U.S.-style contingency fees
foreclosed the possibility of avoiding the chilling effect of these rules.
In the same vein, the combination of a Loser Pays Rule and other

cost-enhancing and benefit-reducing legal features made derivative
litigation, which was already normally economically irrational, even
more financially absurd.
West highlights one additional and ostensibly unique feature of
Japan's post-war derivative actions regime that further added to the
economic irrationality of pursuing derivative actions. According to
Japan's Law on the Fee of Civil Lawsuits, prior to filing a civil claim,
all plaintiffs must purchase a revenue stamp (inshi) and attach it to
the claim.' 0 5 The fee levied by the court for the revenue stamp is
determined by the nature of the claim.' 0 6 In claims where the
economic benefit to the plaintiff is deemed "calculable," the stamp fee
is calculated on a sliding scale contingent on the amount of damages
claimed (e.g., about $31,000 for a $10 million claim and $210,000 for a
$100 million claim). 10 7 In claims where the economic benefit to the
plaintiff is deemed "incalculable," the amount of the stamp fee is set
at a nominal fixed flat rate (V13,000, or about $130).108 In the case of
both calculable and incalculable claims, if the plaintiff succeeds in the
claim then the stamp revenue fee is reimbursed to the plaintiff by the

defendant.109

104.
Id. at 1502-03.
105.
Id. at 1463.
106.
Fujita, supra note 6, at 17.
107.
For the approximation of the filing fees, we use the amount stated in Kenji
Utsumi's article in yen and then convert them at the exchange rate of V100 per dollar.
Although the amount is not precise and the rate of the yen fluctuates, the purpose is to
provide the reader with a rough estimate of the cost of the fee. Kenji Utsumi, The
Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits in Japan: A Comparison
with Those in the United States, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 129, 132-33 (2001). For
descriptions of how the stamp fee is calculated, see ODA, supra note 72, at 254; Fujita,
supra note 6, at 16-17; West, Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1,
at 1463-64. It should be noted that it is relatively common in civil law countries to
calculate court fees based on the amount of damages claimed. In fact, the current
system that applies to derivative actions in China is remarkably similar to the stamp
fee system that applied to pre-19 9 3 Japanese derivative actions. LI, supra note 5, at
294-95.
108.
Minji-sosho-hoyou-ho [Law on the Fee of Civil Lawsuits], Law No. 40 of
1965, art. 4, para. 2 (Japan), translatedin Act on Costs of Civil Procedure,JAPANESE L.
TRANSLATION (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law; Kaisha-h5
[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 847, para. 6 (Japan), translated in
Companies Act (Part V, Part VI, Part VII and Part VIII), JAPANESE L. TRANSLATION
(Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law.
109.
West, Pricingof Shareholder DerivativeActions, supra note 1, at 1464.
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Prior to 1993, Japanese court officials classified all Article 267
Derivative Actions as "calculable claims."110 As such, before filing a
derivative action, plaintiff-shareholders had to pay a substantial
stamp fee that increased according to the amount of damages
claimed."' West asserts that this stamp fee system was the "death
knell" for derivative litigation in post-war Japan. 112 There is no doubt
that requiring plaintiff-shareholders to pay a potentially significant
stamp fee added another cost to derivative actions, which increased
the likelihood of them being economically irrational. However, as
explained above, even without the stamp fee there was normally no
rational reason in post-war Japan for economically motivated
13
shareholders to pursue derivative actions.'
In sum, the derivative action was scarcely used during the first
thirty-five years of its existence in post-war Japan. Based on the
assumption of the economically motivated and rational shareholder
litigant, this was entirely predictable. As was the case in many
countries (excluding the United States), the chilling effect of the
Shareholder Benefit and Cost rules, absence of U.S.-style contingency
fees, and a host of other cost-enhancing and benefit-reducing legal
features made derivative litigation patently irrational for almost all
economically motivated Japanese shareholders. The explanation
provided by the classical economic rational choice theory, that
shareholders in Japan would only pursue derivative actions when the
direct financial benefit exceeded the cost, appeared to make perfect
sense-until, suddenly, it did not.
B. Japan'sExplosion of Derivative Actions: (Mis) Understood
Through the Lens of the Economically Motivated
and RationalShareholderLitigant
and Its Testable Hypotheses
In the late 1980s, the rational economic lens through which so
many scholars started to view Japanese derivative actions suddenly
began to blur. At first, it seemed like little more than innocuous
media hype arising out of the "massive publicity" that the derivative
action received from the 1986 Mitsui Mining decision and the 1990
U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative negotiations." 4 As

110.
ODA, supra note 72, at 254; Fujita, supra note 6, at 16-17.
111.
West, Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1463-64.
112.
Id. at 1463.
113.
See supra text accompanying note 28.
114.
West, Pricingof Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1499-500;
see Mizuno v. Ariyoshi (Mitsui Mining), T6ky5 Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May
29, 1986, 1194 HANREI JIHO [HANJI] 33, aff'd, T6ky5 K6t6 Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.]
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explained in Part V below, these two events had a de minimis impact
on the economic rationale for pursuing derivative actions, but the
media attention proved powerful.1 1 5 The derivative action, which had
been seen as an obscure and impotent artifact of the American
occupation, came to be perceived as an important tool for shareholder
activism and corporate governance reform. 116 Then, perception
became reality.
In the early 1990s, empirical evidence revealed what the narrow
lens of rational economics could not foresee. With no obvious change
in the cost-benefit structure of the derivative action, presumptively
economically motivated and rational Japanese shareholders began to
sue.11 7 It began in 1990 with a handful of derivative actions per
year-when historically a single derivative action was a banner
year.118 By the end of 1992, there were 31 derivative actions pending

July 3, 1989, 1188 JUNKAN SHOJI HOMU [SHOJI HOMU] 36, aft'd, Saik5 Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Sept. 9, 1993, 47 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHI] 4814 (Japan).
115.
See infra Part V.
116.
According to Kawashima & Sakurai,
The tide began to turn with the judgment in Mitsui Mining issued by the
Tokyo District Court in 1986.... The court's treatment of Mitsui's
mismanagement in 1986 sparked heightened interest in the derivative suit
mechanism and opened the door to increased shareholder activism ....
Since
the late 1980s, the derivative suit mechanism has been at the forefront of the
debate surrounding Japanese corporate law. Its prominence led to the 1993
reform of the Commercial Code, which, in turn, brought about a sudden
increase in the number of derivative suits filed.
Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17-18 (citation omitted). The first book
devoted entirely to derivative action-a mass-marketed account of the derivative
litigation explosion-was written and published by the editors of Nihon Keizai Shinbun
(Japan's version of the Wall Street Journal)in spring 1993. NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN,
KABUNUSHI NO HANRAN [SHAREHOLDER REBELLION] (Nihon Keizai Shinbun ed., 1993).
117.
See infra Part V.C.
118.
Based on a search conducted on May 31, 2011 on the LEX/DB Internet
Database of Japanese case law there were seven reported derivative actions filed
between January 1990 and November 1993 (i.e., when the stamp fee regulations were
amended). Comparing the DA Database (for a description of the DA Database, see text
accompanying notes 152-53) with the number of actions filed it appears that
approximately one out of every six actions that is filed ends up being a reported
decision. See infra Appendix A, Table 1, Appendix B, Table 1. Therefore, we can
estimate that approximately forty actions were filed during this period. This makes
sense considering that thirty-one actions were pending at the end of 1992. Here is a list
of the actions filed between 1990 and the 1993 stamp fee reduction: Hamada v. Nakano
(Chukyo Bank Case), Nagoya Chih5 Saibansho [Nagoya Dist. Ct.] Jan. 20, 1997, 1600
HANJI 144 (Japan); Nichi-Bei Shoji KK v. Anonymous Party (Japan Aviation Elecs.
Indus. Case), Toky6 Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 20, 1996, 1572 HANJI 27
(Japan); Suzuki v. Yasuda (Janome Sewing Mach. Co. Case), TOky5 Chih6 Saibansho
[Tokyo Dist. Ct.] July 8, 1994, 1750 HANJI 40 (Japan); Yoshitake v. Todani (NihonSunrise Case), Toky5 Chih5 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Mar. 31, 1994, 1354 SHOJI
HOMU 134, settled in TOky5 KOt5 Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Sept. 21, 1993, 1480
HANJI 154 (Japan); Asai v. Iwasaki (Nikk5 Sec. Case), Toky5 Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo
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before Japanese courts-more than the total number of derivative
actions that were brought in the first three and a half postwar
decades." 9 In 1993, the number of derivative actions more than
doubled, with 86 cases pending before Japanese courts. 120 Over the
next five years, derivative actions filed and pending in Japanese
courts continued to rise, peaking in 1999 with 95 new actions filed
and a total of 222 actions pending. 121 From 2000 to 2009, the number
of new actions filed per year declined slightly but maintained a
previously unimaginable high average rate of 73.7 new actions filed
per year. 122 In total, what started out as media-hype in the late 1980s
has transformed into well over 1,000 derivative actions against
123
directors and statutory auditors of Japanese companies.
The statistics may appear a bit dry, but the revelation is
astounding: "non-litigious" Japan now competes with Delaware for
the title of the jurisdiction with the highest frequency of derivative
litigation in the world. 124 This competition has left ardent supporters
of the cultural theory deafeningly silent. It has caused most pundits,
who blindly accept the assumption of the economically motivated and
rational shareholder, to cobble together a shaky financial cost-benefit
story in an attempt to explain the cataclysmic change in the behavior
of Japanese shareholders. 12 5 Admirably, West has neither remained
silent nor blindly accepted the assumption of the economically
motivated and rational shareholder litigant. To the contrary, in his

Dist. Ct.] Aug. 11, 1992, 1610 HANJI 116, rev'd, Taky6 Kot6 Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.]
Mar. 30, 1993, 109 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU [SHIRYOBAN SHOJI] 70 (Japan); Imamura v.
Muraki (Cemedine Case), TSky5 Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] May 18, 1992, 144
SHIRYOBAN SHOJI 115 (Japan); Ikenaka v. Tabuchi (Nomura Sec. Case), TSky6 Chih6
Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 13, 1992, 54 MINSHO 1798 (Japan); Rosenhof v.
Moriya (Tokyo Cruise Ship Case), TSky5 Chih5 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Oct. 26,
1995, 1549 HANJI 125 (Japan).
119.
HIDEYUKI KOBAYASHI & TsuYOSHI HARA, KABUNUSHI DAIHYO SOSHO:
ZENHANREI TO RIRON 0 SHIRU [SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTION: KNOW ALL CASES
AND THEORIES] 3 (1996) (Japan).
For the unpublished statistics provided to the Authors by the Supreme
120.
Court of Japan, see infra Appendix A, Table 1.
Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
121.
122.
Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
123.
Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
124.
This fact has been almost completely overlooked in the literature. For
example, Leslie Cooney states that, "[wihile somewhat on the rise in Japan, derivative
actions are still rather infrequent because of low economic awards in the litigated as
well as the settled case." Leslie Larkin Cooney, A Modality for Accountability to
Shareholders:The American Way?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 717, 717 (2003).
125.
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 174-75; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 225;
Aronson, supra note 1, at 24; Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463; Fujita, supra
note 6, at 16-17; Milhaupt Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 6, at 2115; West,
Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1441-44; West, Information,
Institutions,and Extortion, supra note 6, at 783.
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often cited 2001 article, he departs from his original zeal for the
assumption of the economically motivated and rational shareholder
litigant by admitting that non-economic motives and irrational
behavior likely have played some role in Japan's orgy of derivative
litigation. 126 However, West still clings to his original claim that
when considering both the motivation of shareholders and the
attorneys which represent them, economic motives and rational
behavior remain the main drivers of derivative litigation in Japan (as
12 7
well as the United States).

126.
In his 1994 article, West strictly adhered to the assumption of the rational
litigant and largely assumed that Japanese shareholder litigants were driven solely by
an ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis. As stated by West:
[D]ecisions on whether to bring derivative actions are primarily determined not
by culture, but by economics. Essentially, by creating cost-benefit incentives,
legal rules effectively set prices for actions. When making behavioral choices,
rational actors will choose the action that has the lowest price relative to that
action's available substitutes. This idea can be separated into two central
claims, each of which is premised on this 'price story'. . . .Thus, beginning in
1990, an increase in derivative litigation of all sorts.., occurred. The most
appealing explanation for this increase is the price story, specifically, the
benefit side of the cost-benefit price equation. Stated simply, more shareholders
sued because suing suddenly became potentially more rewarding....
Generally, shareholders make decisions regarding derivative litigation just as
they make any other decision: add up the benefits, deduct the costs, and if the
result is positive after factoring in individual preferred levels of risk, bring suit.
West, Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1441-42, 1456-57,
1498. West specifically argues that irrational behavior by shareholders did not have
any meaningful effect on the rise of derivative litigation in Japan. In his words,
Though the 'publicity effect' could be viewed as a kind of 'groupthink,' an
irrational decision making process, a better explanation is that publicity lowers
agency costs, specifically the costs of acquiring information about one's legal
rights as a shareholder. In the United States, where derivative actions are
relatively abundant, the common-law system and relatively easy access to legal
professionals perform this publicity function; in Japan, the press fulfills that
role. Thus, the publicity preceding the derivative action increase in Japan
further indicates the validity of the price story.
Id. at 1500.
127.
In his 2001 article, West acknowledges that economically motivated
behavior cannot account for all derivative litigation in Japan. As he explains, "some
suits appear to reflect little or no obvious individual economic motivation for any party"
and "some plaintiffs clearly appear to be suing for nonmonetary reasons." However,
West ultimately concludes that rational lawyers motivated by attorneys' fees are "the
driving force behind Japanese derivative litigation." West claims that non-economic
motives and irrational behavior provides merely a "residual explanation" that accounts
for a handful of derivative actions that cannot otherwise be fully explained through
classical economic rational choice theory. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The
Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 354, 372, (2001) [hereinafter West, Why
ShareholdersSue].
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Let us start with the shaky story told by the masses and then
move to the more interesting story provided by West. As told by the
vast majority of pundits, the explanation for the enormous increase in
the rate of derivative litigation in Japan is clear and simple. The
story begins in March 1993, with the Tokyo High Court's decision in
the Nikk5 Securities case. 128 In that case, the Court accepted the
shareholder-plaintiffs argument that the stamp fee for filing
derivative actions should be a nominal fixed rate (and not the
prevailing rate based on the amount of damages claimed) because the
economic benefit for shareholder-plaintiffs in derivative actions is
"incalculable."'1 29 In November 1993, following the Tokyo High
Court's reasoning, the Diet revised Article 267 of the Commercial
Code to make it clear that all derivative actions were "incalculable"
claims. 130 This amendment effectively lowered the stamp fee for filing
derivative actions from a potentially substantial amount based on the
amount
of damages claimed to a nominal fixed rate of Y8,200 (about
131
$82).

Tomotaka Fujita, a leading University of Tokyo corporate law
professor, proclaims that the 1993 amendment lowering the stamp fee
for derivative actions was unquestionably "one of the most influential
events in the history of the Japanese corporate governance
regime."'132 He goes on to point out that although Japan's nonlitigious culture has sometimes erroneously been used to explain the
dearth of derivative actions, "the litigation fee became recognized as
the real determining factor" in the rise of derivative actions. 133 The
assumption underlying this consensus view is that the 1993 reduction
in the stamp fee tipped the ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis in
favor of pursuing derivative actions in Japan. 134 In other words, as

128.
Asai v. Iwasaki (Nikk5 Sec.), T~ky6 Chih6 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Aug.
11, 1992, 1610 HANJI 116, rev'd, T~ky6 K6t5 Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Mar. 30, 1993,
109 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI HOMU [SHIRYOBAN SHOJI] 70 (Japan). An appeal to the Supreme
Court was denied.
129.
ODA, supra note 72, at 254; Fujita, supra note 6, at 16-17; Kawashima &
Sakurai, supra note 4, at 20.
130.
See sources cited supranote 129.
See sources cited supra note 129. After the law was further amended in
131.
2003, the nominal fixed rate was increased from V8,200 (about $82) to Y13,000 (about
$130). Minji-sosho-hoyou-ho [Law on the Fee of Civil Lawsuits], Law No. 40 of 1965,
art. 4, para. 2 (Japan), translated in Act on Costs of Civil Procedure, Japanese L.
Translation (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law.
132.
Fujita, supra note 6, at 15.
133.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
134.
Cheffins and Black assert a similar view: "Japan is an exception to the
pattern; derivative litigation is common. The growth in derivative suits after Japan cut
filing fees and permitted the recovery of U.S.-style attorneys' fees highlights the impact
of the various constraints on derivative litigation existing in the other countries we
have considered." Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463.
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the economic rational choice theory would predict, post-1993
Japanese shareholders rationally pursued derivative actions because
the financial benefit exceeded the cost (where previously the opposite
was true). This post-1993 "economically motivated and rational
shareholder claim" provides the first testable hypothesis.
The story told by West in his 2001 article is more methodical and
persuasive than the consensus view, but as demonstrated in the next
Part, it ultimately misses the mark. West begins his story with the
familiar claim that the 1993 reduction in the stamp fee explains
"much of the increase in [derivative actions] filed."'13 5 He further
suggests that the burst of Japan's economic bubble in the early 1990s
136
may also account for some of the increase in derivative actions.
Specifically, West argues that the steep decline in the Japanese
market likely decreased the transaction cost of pursuing derivative
actions by making it easier to establish damages resulting from
directors' misconduct.' 3 7 These two preliminary arguments
mundanely track the post-1993 economically motivated and rational
shareholder hypothesis.
West's story, however, takes a refreshingly insightful turn. He
acknowledges that the dramatic increase in derivative actions is
"intriguing given the continuing [post-1993] lack of shareholder
incentives to sue.' 38 In fact, West admits that his extensive empirical
analysis of Japanese derivative actions points to a lack of clear
financial incentives for pursing derivative litigation in Japan. 3 9 As
he explains, "some suits appear to reflect little or no obvious
individual economic motivation for any party," and "some plaintiffs
140
clearly appear to be suing for nonmonetary reasons."'
Unfortunately, West's story does not end with non-economic motives
or irrational behavior as its main actors.
Although West's empirical evidence arguably appears to suggest
otherwise, his 2001 article retreats to the safe, familiar and
predictable ground of the economically motivated and rational
shareholder-attorney theory. Based on the limited empirical evidence
available in 2001, West claims that non-economic factors provide
merely a "residual explanation" that accounts for a handful of
derivative actions that cannot otherwise be fully explained through
economically motivated and rational behavior. 41 He claims that
similar to the United States, rational lawyers motivated by attorneys'

135.
136.
137.

West, Why Shareholders Sue, supranote 127, at 353.
Id.
Id.

138.

Id.

139.
140.
141.

Id. at 372-73.
Id.
Id. at 372.
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1 42
fees are "the driving force behind Japanese derivative litigation.'
Somewhat surprisingly, West makes this claim while at the same
time acknowledging that Japanese attorneys lack the high-powered
143
economic incentives provided by U.S.-style contingency fees.
However, he claims that "Japanese attorneys can profit based
on... up-front retainer provisions."' 44 West also places considerable
stock in a group of what he describes as "elite attorneys" (the
Kabunushi Onbuzuman) who have found a way to act together to
diversify the risk of derivative litigation and turn a handsome
profit. 14 5 In short, West's central argument is that attorneys acting
rationally based purely on an ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis
are driving derivative litigation in Japan. The "economically
motivated and rational attorney claim" is the second testable
hypothesis.
Finally, there are several events that have occurred post-1993
that a number of prominent scholars suggest fundamentally altered
the financial cost-benefit equation for pursuing derivative actions in
Japan. Such events range from the ostensibly watershed Daiwa Bank
decision to the current global financial crisis. 146 Assuming that
shareholders or lawyers rationally decide to pursue derivative actions
based on an ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis, one would expect
the rate of derivative litigation to closely track changes in Japan's
institutional structure that impact the financial costs and benefits of
pursuing derivative actions. The "financial tracking claim" is the
third testable hypothesis.
Taken together, these three testable hypotheses form the core
claims that have been used to maintain the assumption that
economically motivated and rational actors drive derivative litigation
in Japan. As will be demonstrated in the next Part, based on what (to
our knowledge) is the most extensive empirical analysis ever
undertaken on the Japanese derivative action, there is little support
for any of these three hypotheses.

142.
Id. at 354.
143.
Id. at 381-82.
144.
Id. at 381.
145.
Id. at 369-70.
146.
See Aronson, supra note 1, at 18-21 (providing an in-depth analysis of the
Daiwa case); Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 1, at 57 (claiming that the state of
Japan's economy may have an important impact on its rate of civil litigation).
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IV. PUTTING THE HYPOTHESES OF THE ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED
AND RATIONAL JAPANESE DERIVATIVE LITIGANT TO THE TEST

A. Testing the Economically Motivated and Rational
ShareholderHypothesis: Do ShareholdersFinancially
Benefit from DerivativeActions in Japan?

At first blush, the simplicity and intuitive logic of the
economically motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis is
enchanting. As the theory goes, prior to 1993, expensive stamp fees
normally made the financial cost of Japanese derivative litigation
greater than the benefit. After 1993, nominal stamp fees normally
made the financial benefit of Japanese derivative litigation greater
than the cost. The sharp rise in post-1993 derivative actions
demonstrates that Japanese shareholder litigants are economically
motivated and rational-that they only sue when the financial benefit
exceeds the cost. This neatly packaged answer for why derivative
147
litigation has increased in Japan is difficult for pundits to resist.
The careful reader, however, will likely be less tempted. On its
face, the economically motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis
suffers from two significant logical gaps. First, as outlined above,
although the stamp fee was reduced in 1993, the rate of derivative
litigation started to sharply increase approximately three years
earlier in 1990.148 This critically important fact has been almost
entirely glossed over in the literature. Indeed, West's empirically
exhaustive 2001 article allocates a mere single sentence to explain
the substantial pre-1993 increase in derivative litigation and fails to
mention or incorporate any analysis of the pre-1993 increase in his
149
primary explanation for the rise of derivative litigation in Japan.

147.
The shareholders hypothesis is not normally set out in such explicit terms.
Normally, the stamp fee is cited as having caused or led to an increase in the rate of
derivative actions. In the vast majority of cases, there is no mention or suggestion that
part of the increase may be the result of non-economic motives or irrational behavior.
In this sense, it is fair to say that pundits have, for the most part, implicitly accepted
the assumption of the economically motivated and rational shareholder litigant.
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 174-75; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 225; Aronson,
supra note 2, at 24; Cheffins & Black, supra note 5, at 1463; Fujita, supra note 6, at 16;
Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction, supra note 6, at 2115; West Pricing of
Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1441-44; West, Information,
Institutions, and Extortion, supra note 6, at 783. Indeed, West in his 1994 article
explicitly accepted the assumption of the economically motivated and rational
shareholder and rejected the argument that even part of the rise in derivative
litigation may be the result of economic irrationality. See West, Pricing of Shareholder
DerivativeActions, supranote 1, at 1501.
148.
See supranotes 6, 117-23 and accompanying text.
149.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 380. It should be noted
that in his 1994 article West explicitly acknowledged the pre-1993 rise in derivative
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The pre-1993 cases alone provide convincing evidence that something
other than the reduction in the stamp fee has played a significant role
in driving derivative litigation in Japan.
Second, the mere fact that there is a correlation between the rate
of derivative litigation and the reduction in the stamp fee tells us
little. As every undergraduate statistics student learns in their first
lecture, correlation does not equal causation. There are a myriad of
explanations that may account for the increase in derivative actions
following the 1993 reduction in the stamp fee which have little or
nothing to do with the fee reduction. Indeed, there is evidence to
suggest that the pre-1993 increase in derivative actions may actually
have caused the stamp fee to be reduced-turning the claim that the
150
fee reduction caused the increase in derivative actions on its head.
In Part V, this Article will explain the forces that likely drove the pre1993 cases and which may have brought about the reduction in the
stamp fee. However, at this juncture, the salient point is that,
without even delving into the details, the logical foundation of the
economically motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis appears
shaky.
The true devil for the economically motivated and rational
shareholder hypothesis, however, is in the empirical details. Our
empirical analysis of over 200 reported decisions and 1,000 filed
actions between 1986 and 2009 reveals a fact that cannot be
understood solely through the lens of the economically motivated and
rational shareholder hypothesis: even after the 1993 stamp fee
reduction, Japanese shareholders do not appear to benefit financially
from derivative litigation. 151 From an economic rational choice
perspective, this fact renders any discussion of the reduction in the
stamp fee (or for that matter, any other cost associated with
derivative litigation) essentially moot. If shareholders do not stand to
benefit financially from derivative litigation, then according to the
economic rational choice theory they will not sue. This is particularly
true in Japan, where the reduced stamp fee is non-zero, there is a
Loser Pays Rule for court costs, and there historically has not been a
U.S.-style contingency fee system-all of which means that Japanese
shareholders must endure significant financial risk in order to pursue

litigation. West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1493-501.
However, he did not include an analysis of such cases in his 2001 article. West, Why
Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 353.
150.
This view is supported by Kawashima & Sakurai. In their view, "since the
late 1980s, the derivative suit mechanism has been at the forefront of the debate
surrounding Japanese corporate law. Its prominence led to the 1993 reform of the
Commercial Code, which, in turn, brought about a sudden increase in the number of
derivative suits filed." Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17 (citation omitted).
151.
See infra Appendix B, Tables 1-7.
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a derivative action. In short, if the conclusion that Japanese
shareholders normally do not benefit financially from derivative
litigation is correct, the economically motivated and rational
shareholder hypothesis must fail.
The obvious starting point for analyzing whether shareholders
financially benefit from derivative actions is to examine their success
rate in court. To do this, we collected information from several
Japanese databases on reported derivative actions filed between the
1993 stamp fee reduction and the end of 2009.152 This information
was then combined to create "the DA Database." The DA Database
contains a total of 174 reported derivative actions and to our
knowledge has the widest scope of available information on Japanese
derivative actions during this period. Out of the 174 reported
derivative actions, 26 actions had no reported final result (i.e., they
had not been dismissed, withdrawn or settled and there was no
reported judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or defendant). As
such, these 26 actions were excluded from the analysis as their
success rate is yet to be determined. Several empirical tests were
then conducted on the remaining 148 actions to determine the success
1 53
of shareholder- plaintiffs in Japanese courts.
The empirical tests suggest that Japanese shareholder-plaintiffs
rarely succeed in court. Out of all the reported derivative actions with
final results, only 9.5 percent of the actions resulted in a judgment for
the plaintiff at trial.' 5 4 The chance of succeeding at trial was even
more dismal for shareholders of listed companies, who succeeded in
only 5 percent of derivative actions filed. 155 The abysmal performance
of derivative shareholder-plaintiffs in court is further evidenced by

152. Raw data was collected on reported derivative actions from several sources.
First, a list of reported derivative actions and relevant information on each action was
collected from the legal journal Shiry6ban sh6ji homu. Specifically, information from
two charts, Shuyona Kabunushi-Daihyo-SoshoIchiran-hyo, 291 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI 103,
103 tbl. (2008) (Japan); 309 SHIRYOBAN SHOJI 92, 92 tbl. (2009) (Japan), containing
information on reported derivative actions was merged into a single Excel spreadsheet.
The Shiry6ban sh~ji h5mu is widely regarded as the most extensive source of reported
derivative actions in Japan. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 357.
Then, on March 1, 2010 a search was conducted on the LEX/DB Internet TKC
Corporation and the NIKKEI Telecom twenty-one web-databases to supplement the
Excel spreadsheet with additional reported cases and information. Finally, on March 1,
2010, a search was conducted on the website ofKabunushi Onbuzurman (Shareholders
Ombudsman) (KO) to gather information on which actions in the Excel spreadsheet
database were KO actions. KABUNUSHI ONBUZUMAN (SHAREHOLDERS OMBUDSMAN),
http://kabuombu.sakura.ne.jp (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) [hereinafter KO WEBSITE]
(Japan). The final Excel spreadsheet containing the information from the above
searches is referred to in this paper as the "DA Database."
153.
For detailed statistics on the results of the actions filed, see infra Appendix
B, Table 1.
154.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
155.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
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the fact that 58 percent of actions involving listed companies ended in
the court either finding in favor of the defendant or dismissing the
action. 156 A further 6.7 percent of derivative actions involving listed
companies were withdrawn by shareholder-plaintiffs-this normally
occurs in response to an adverse court ruling.157
Even in the rare cases in which a derivative action succeeded,
the financial benefit to shareholders was marginal. The average
amount awarded to listed companies in successful derivative actions
was equivalent to a 2.5 percent increase in the company's share
price. 158 This is a paltry sum considering that in listed companies
only one out of every twenty derivative actions succeeds and
159
shareholder-plaintiffs often own only a small amount of shares.
Such a miniscule chance of success, and negligible returns even when
an action succeeds, suggest that it is normally economically irrational
for Japanese shareholders to accept the financial risk of derivative
litigation for the remote chance of succeeding at trial.
Japanese shareholder-plaintiffs are not alone in their remote
chance of succeeding at trial. According to Romano's often cited
empirical study on shareholder litigation in the United States, it is
16 0
extremely rare for U.S. shareholder-plaintiffs to succeed at trial.
Rather, in the United States, the majority of shareholder actions
against listed companies end in settlements. 161 Romano's empirical
study found that 65 percent of shareholder actions resulted in a
settlement. 16 2 She further suggests that such settlements rarely
benefit shareholders and are primarily driven by economically
motivated and rational attorneys who exploit the U.S. contingency fee
system to benefit handsomely from derivative litigation. 163 However,
as Japan has historically lacked a U.S.-style contingency fee system,
settlements could conceivably be more beneficial for shareholders in
Japan than they are in the United States. 164 If this is the case, in
spite of their abysmal fortunes at trial, Japanese shareholder-

156.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
157.
158.
For relevant statistics, see infra Appendix B, Table 2.
159.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
160.
Romano, supranote 2, at 60.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 84-85. Several leading scholars support the theory that rational
attorneys driven by contingency fees are a significant reason for the relatively high
rate of derivative litigation in the United States. See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supranote
5, at 175; REISBERG, supra note 5, at 226-27; Cheffins & Black supra note 5, at 139394; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 351; see also supra note 45.
164.

Jon Choy, Japan'sLegal System on the Stand, 35 JAPAN ECON. INST. REP.,

Sept. 2000, at 1; West, Pricing of ShareholderDerivative Actions, supranote 1, at 145657; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 365.
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plaintiffs may be pursuing derivative actions to reap the financial
rewards of settlement.
Unfortunately for shareholder-plaintiffs in Japan, when it comes
to benefiting from settlements they again appear to be an unlucky lot.
Based on the DA Database, only 27 percent of derivative actions
ended in a settlement-considerably lower than the settlement rate
in the United States. 165 Still, the mere fact that shareholder-plaintiffs
in Japan are less likely to receive a settlement than U.S.
shareholders does not in itself suggest that settlements are
irrelevant. From an economically motivated and rational shareholder
perspective, the critical question is: do such settlements normally
provide a financial benefit greater than the cost of derivative
litigation? The paltry amounts that have been received by companies
in derivative action settlements strongly suggests that the answer to
this question is "no." Based on the DA Database, on average the sum
received by listed companies in settlements amounted to a theoretical
increase of YO.2 (about $0.002) per share, or the equivalent of a 0.05
percent increase in their stock price. 166 It is inconceivable that such
miniscule settlements could provide an incentive for economically
motivated and rational shareholders to incur the financial risk of
derivative litigation.
In spite of shareholders' abysmal record in court and the history
of paltry settlements, it is theoretically possible that they may still
receive financial benefits from derivative litigation if the market
views such litigation as a positive event for the financial future of the
company involved in the action. The mere act of filing a derivative
action may be viewed as a positive economic event by shareholders
because of its ability to inspire corporate governance reform or deter
corporate insiders from engaging in future wealth-reducing
behavior-even if such actions normally do not result in any
significant direct monetary gains for the company. Assuming this is
the case, economically motivated and rational Japanese shareholders
may be filing derivative actions to reap the stock price gains that flow
from improving the company's expected future performance.
To examine whether there is any empirical support for this view,
an event study was conducted using the standard methodology to
measure the stock price effects of filing a derivative action. 167 The
event study was conducted on all of the derivate actions in the DA
Database that involved listed companies and that were filed before

Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
165.
166.
For detailed statistics on the results of settlements, see infra Appendix B,
Table 3.
Romano, supra note 2, at 65-66; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note
167.
127, at 358.
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the end of 2006. As with similar event studies, twenty-one of the
selected actions were then excluded because the historical stock price
data was unobtainable as a result of companies being merged or delisted.16 8 Table 4 in Appendix B shows the results of the event study
on eighty-six listed Japanese companies-which we believe is the
169
largest such study ever conducted on Japanese companies.
According to our regression analysis, the filing of a derivative
action in Japan does not result in statistically significant stock price
movements. 170 This suggests that shareholders do not expect to
receive any financial gains from improved corporate performance as a
result of filing derivative actions. It also confirms the earlier
empirical findings that shareholders do not expect to receive any
significant direct financial benefits in the form of payments to the
company resulting from derivative actions. These results are
unsurprising considering the low success rate of derivative actions
and the marginal amount recovered in settlements-not to mention
the time that management must divert away from running the
business to deal with derivative litigation.
Other event studies were conducted using various periods of time
and data points in the DA Database to determine whether there were
any statistically significant stock price reactions to Japanese
derivative litigation. The only statistically significant result
uncovered was with respect to the effect that settlements had on the
stock price of listed companies. Specifically, on the day of and the day
after settlement there was a statistically significant increase in a
company's stock price. 171 This makes sense. When a derivative action
is terminated, it saves the company's management from protracted
litigation and avoids the potential negative publicity of a trial. Also, a
settlement payment to the company, however small, should be viewed
positively by the market. The statistically significant finding also
confirms the earlier stated empirical evidence that the amount
awarded in settlements is normally marginal. Although settlements
result in a statistically significant stock price increase, the amount of
the increase was only 2.6 percent in a company's stock price over the
two-day period. 172 This amount is unlikely to motivate an
economically motivated and rational shareholder who would have to
incur the cost of four derivative actions (as only 27 percent, or

168.
West, Why ShareholdersSue, supra note 127, at 358.
169.
West's study considered fifty-one actions and Romano's study sixty-six
actions. Id.
170.
See infra Appendix B, Table 4.
171.
For detailed statistics on the stock price reaction to settlements, see infra
Appendix B, Table 5.
172.
Infra Appendix B, Table 5.
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approximately one in four actions end in a settlement) to receive such
modest gains.
In sum, there is no empirical evidence to support the
economically motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis.
Shareholders rarely succeed in derivative actions and even when they
reach a settlement or are successful at trial the amount that they
recover is negligible. In fact, according to our event study,
shareholders do not even expect derivative actions to either directly
or indirectly result in stock price gains. These empirical results are
unsurprising. Two smaller event studies conducted by West and
Fukuda on Japanese derivative actions arrived at the same general
conclusion. 173 Romano's seminal event study on derivative actions in
the United States reached a similar conclusion. 174 What is surprising
is that in the face of such empirical evidence, the economically
motivated and rational shareholder hypothesis is still thought to
provide the primary explanation for the high rate of derivative
175
litigation in Japan.
B. Testing the Economically Motivated and Rational Attorney
Hypothesis: Do Economically Motivated and Rational
Attorneys Drive Derivative Litigation in Japan?
The empirical evidence that shareholders do not financially
benefit from derivative actions substantially weakens the argument
that Japanese derivative litigation can be understood solely through
the lens of economic motives and rational behavior. However, even
after acknowledging in his 2001 article that shareholders do not
financially benefit from derivative litigation, West still maintains
that economic motives and rational behavior explain the vast
majority of derivative litigation in Japan. 176 As explained above, at
the core of West's argument is his economically motivated and
rational attorney hypothesis. 177 According to this hypothesis, similar
to in the United States, rational attorneys motivated by attorneys'
178
fees are the primary drivers of derivative litigation in Japan.

173.
Fujita, supra note 6, at 18; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at
357-64; see also, e.g., Mitsuo Fukuda, Kabunushi Daihyo Sosho ha Ko-pore-to
Gabanansu no Shudan to Shite Yuko ka [Are Derivative Suits an Efficient Corporate
Governance Tool?], in GENDAI NO KIN'YU TO SEISAKU [MODERN FINANCE AND POLICY]

347 (Hiroshi Kosano & Yuzo Honda eds., 2000) (Japan).
174.
Romano, supra note 2, at 84-85.
175.
See supra Part III.B.
176.
West, Why ShareholdersSue, supra note 127, at 380-82.
177.
See id.
178.
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West's economically motivated and rational attorney hypothesis
has two flaws, one logical and one empirical. The logical flaw is rooted
in the fact that unlike American attorneys, Japanese attorneys that
represent shareholder-plaintiffs are normally not compensated on a
U.S.-style contingency fee basis. 179 To the contrary, the common
practice in Japanese derivative litigation is for attorneys to require
shareholder litigants to pay two fees: (1) an upfront nonrefundable
retainer (chakushukin)based on the amount of damages claimed; and
(2) a "success fee" (hoshukin) based on the amount of damages
actually received.' 8 0 The precise amount of these two fees has
historically been determined by a fee schedule published by the
1 81
Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (the "Fee Rules").
Although it has never been mandatory for attorneys to strictly follow
the Fee Rules, all available evidence suggests that attorneys either
follow the Fee Rules to the letter or closely approximate them. 8 2 On
April 1, 2004, the Fee Rules were amended to explicitly provide
attorneys and clients with the authority to set their own fee
arrangements. 8 3 However, even after the 2004 amendment, the
former Fee Rules still normally provide the default terms for
84
attorneys' fees in derivative litigation.
The fact that attorneys in Japan require shareholder litigants to
pay a nonrefundable retainer presents a logical problem for West's
claim that attorneys drive shareholder litigation. In such a system, if
a shareholder is unwilling to pay the initial retainer, then a
derivative action will not be pursued. As explained above, this is
fundamentally different from the United States where shareholders
normally participate in derivative litigation without incurring any
direct financial costs. Indeed, in a system like Japan's (which is
similar to the systems in most other countries), 8 5 where
shareholders must decide whether to incur direct financial costs prior
to pursuing a derivative action, it is the shareholders-not
attorneys-who ultimately drive derivative litigation.
West fails to directly address this logical gap in his economically
motivated and rational attorney hypothesis. The only relevant point

179.
Choy, supra note 164, at 1; West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions,
supra note 1, at 1456-57; West, supranote 99 at 365.
180.
West, Why ShareholdersSue, supra note 127, at 365.
181.
For the standard fee schedule, see infra Appendix C, Table 1.
182.
Id.
183.
See DAINI TOKYO BAR ASS'N, http://niben.jp/consul/cost.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2011) (Japan). For detailed rules, see Daini Tokyo Bar Ass'n, Associate
Compensation Bylaws, KAWARAZAKI ATT'Y L. FIRM, http:lwww.asahi-net.or.jp-ZI3H-

KWRZ/law2feeO.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011) (Japan).
184.
Id.
185.
See supra note 36 (noting that unlike the United States, most countries do
not permit contingency fee arrangements).
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that West raises in his 2001 article with respect to the upfront
retainer fee is that in some cases "elite attorneys" allow shareholders
to pay a reduced retainer fee of ¥300,000-¥500,000 (about $3,000$5,000)-that is substantially lower than the amount prescribed by
the Fee Rules.18 6 However, this does not explain why presumably
economically motivated and rational shareholders, who do not stand
to benefit from derivative litigation and may potentially be held liable
for the defendant's court costs, would be willing to pay such a fee. As
demonstrated in the previous Part, the evidence in Japan indicates
that economically motivated and rational shareholders will not pay
such a fee because they do not stand to benefit financially from
derivative litigation.18 7 West's failure to provide an explanation as to
how attorneys can drive litigation when it is shareholders who must
first decide to pay a significant fee to commence an action, fatally
damages his economically motivated and rational attorney
hypothesis.
However, even putting aside this fatal error, empirical evidence
further suggests that the economically motivated and rational
attorney hypothesis is flawed. The DA Database provides little
evidence to support the claim that economically motivated and
rational attorneys have a financial incentive to actively pursue
derivative litigation in Japan.1 88 To the contrary, the empirical
evidence suggests that even if attorneys decided to work on a pure
contingency fee basis-which, as explained above, is the only
arrangement under which one can claim that attorneys truly drive
derivative litigation-they would likely avoid derivative actions in
Japan because of their poor prospect for success.' 8 9 For economically
motivated and rational attorneys to choose to be compensated on a
contingency fee basis, there must be a reasonable chance of
succeeding in the action. As explained in detail below, for the average
attorney (i.e., a non-Activist Attorney) the rate of success in Japanese
derivative litigation is even more abysmal than for the average
shareholder. 9 ) This empirical evidence suggests why even after the
Fee Rules were relaxed in 2004, derivative actions in Japan still
normally do not proceed on a contingency fee basis.
To measure the success rate for attorneys, derivative actions
were divided in the DA Database into two groups based on two
distinct categories of plaintiff attorneys: (1) "Activist Attorneys,"
whom West refers to as "elite attorneys"; and (2) "Passive Attorneys,"

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 369.
See supraPart IV.A.
See text accompanying notes 191-96.
See text accompanying notes 191-96.
See infra Appendix B, Table 1.
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whom West refers to as "non-elite attorneys." 191 Activist Attorneys
are defined as attorneys who represent shareholder-plaintiffs in their
capacity as members of the Kabunushi Onbuzuman (Shareholders
Ombudsman) (KO)-a non-profit organization aimed at "reforming
Japanese management practices to incorporate the views of ordinary
shareholders and citizens. ' 192 Passive Attorneys are defined as
attorneys who represent shareholder-plaintiffs in a capacity other
than as a member of the KO (i.e., as regular "for-profit" attorneys).
Out of the 148 derivative actions in the DA Database with a reported
final result, shareholder-plaintiffs were represented by Activist
Attorneys in 20 percent of the actions and by Passive Attorneys in 80
193
percent of the actions.
The difference in the rate of success between the Passive
Attorneys and Activist Attorneys is dramatic. In derivative actions
undertaken by Passive Attorneys the success rate was abysmal.
Passive Attorneys settled only 16.9 percent of their cases and
succeeded at trial in 9.3 percent of their cases-which amounts to a
combined success rate of 25.2 percent of actions filed. 194 Based on
available evidence, this rate of success appears to be considerably
lower than in other types of civil litigation in Japan. 195 This suggests
that economically motivated and rational Passive Attorneys would
likely only choose to work on derivative actions if they were offered
an upfront retainer by shareholders and had no other more profitable
work available. Indeed, West's results confirm that only the most
desperate Passive Attorneys are willing to take a chance on
derivative litigation and "those that do usually remain in closet sized
offices. '196 In short, the empirical evidence suggests that economically
motivated and rational Passive Attorneys have an incentive to avoid,
not drive, derivative litigation in Japan.
Conversely, the success rate for Activist Attorneys is
astonishingly high. Activist Attorneys settled 66.7 percent of their
cases and succeeded at trial in 10 percent of their cases-which
197
amounts to a combined success rate of 76.7 percent of actions filed.
At first blush, this suggests that at least for Activist Attorneys, the
economically motivated and rational attorney hypothesis makes

191.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 369-70.
192.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 178.
193.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
194.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
195.
In 2008, based on available evidence, it appears that the combined success
rate for plaintiffs in civil monetary claims was approximately 60 percent. See 1
JUDICIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES thl. 19 (2008),
available at http://www.courts.go.jp (describing the number of cleared cases in the
district courts, separated by categories and how they were cleared).
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 371.
196.
197.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
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sense. Indeed, the overall success rate, and particularly the high rate
of settlement for Activist Attorneys is strikingly similar to Romano's
findings in her seminal article on U.S. shareholder litigation. 98
Romano concluded that economically motivated and rational
attorneys, who are motivated by lucrative fees, are a major driver of
derivative litigation in the United States. 99
Unsurprisingly, West's economically motivated and rational
attorney hypothesis is mainly built on the high success rate of
Activist Attorneys. 200 He suggests that Activist Attorneys, who have
"great shot selection" for picking money making cases, seek out
derivative litigation in Japan to obtain the large fees that such
actions offer. 20 1 West further explains how the "organizational
structure chosen by the [Activist Attorneys] leads to profit
maximization. ' 20 2 Specifically, he suggests that Activist Attorneys
use the KO organizational structure to pool their resources and
diversify risk, which provides them with a sound financial basis to
20 3
rationally pursue derivative litigation.
West's analysis would be correct if it were not for the fact that
Activist Attorneys conduct derivative litigation in their capacity as
members of a nonprofit organization. 20 4 Therefore, their motivation is
clearly- not to profit directly from derivative litigation. The fees
generated from the successful derivative actions are used to cover the
organizations' operating expenses and fund its various activities that
range from campaigns to improve shareholders meetings, lobbying for
legislative reform, filing shareholder proposals, and of course,
20 5
conducting derivative actions.
Aside from the fact that the KO is a nonprofit organization,
West's claim, that the KO organizational structure "leads to profit

198.
Romano's empirical study found that 65 percent of shareholder actions
resulted in a settlement. Romano, supra note 2, at 60.
199.
Id. at 84.
200.
West, Why ShareholdersSue, supranote 127, at 369-70.
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 370.
203.
Id.
204.
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the
Kabunushi
Onbuzuman
(Shareholders
Ombudsman)-The Purpose, Activities and Organization of the Association and
Activities for the
Organization, KABUNUSHI
ONBUZUMAN
(SHAREHOLDERS
OMBUDSMAN), http://kabuombu.sakura.ne.jp/archives/guidance.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2011) [hereinafter KO Purpose] (Japan).
205.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35 at 178-81; see KO
WEBSITE, supra note 152 (providing recent news updates on the activities of the
organization); see also About Kabunushi Onbuzuman (Shareholders Ombudsman): Its
Goals
and
Activities,
KoJI
MORIOKA,
http://www.zephyr.dti.ne.jp/-kmoriokaabout%20KOe.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011)
[hereinafter KO Charter] (Japan) (describing the objectives and operations of the
Kabunushi Onbuzuman (Shareholders Ombudsman)).
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maximization," is not supported by the empirical evidence. First, as
West acknowledges, Activist Attorneys normally charge retainer
rates that are well below the market rate-a function of their
nonprofit agenda. 20 6 Second, derivative actions filed by Activist
Attorneys on average claim one-tenth of the damages of other
derivative actions and settle for one-fifth of the amount of settlements
concluded by Passive Attorneys. 20 7 This suggests that Activist
Attorneys may be achieving a high rate of settlement because they
are more concerned with the message sent by a settlement than
monetary gains. This suggestion is confirmed by the fact that many of
these settlements entered into by Activist Attorneys involve not only
cash payments by wrongdoing directors but also commitments from
the company to implement specific mechanisms to prevent the
20 8
conduct from recurring.
In sum, West's economically motivated and rational attorney
hypothesis is flawed. It overlooks the critical fact that shareholders,
not attorneys, are the gatekeepers of derivative litigation in Japan.
Shareholders must normally decide to pay a nonrefundable retainer
fee before an action will be filed, a fundamentally different approach
than U.S. derivative litigation. The theory does not account for the
empirical evidence suggesting that economically motivated and
rational Passive Attorneys will avoid, not pursue, derivative litigation
because of their abysmal success rate. It also fails to account for the
fact that Activist Attorneys act on behalf of a nonprofit organization
and conduct their actions in a manner suggesting that they are not
motivated by profits. On all accounts, the claim that economically
motivated and rational attorneys drive derivative litigation in Japan
is dubious.
C. Testing the FinancialTracking Hypothesis: Does the
Rate of DerivativeActions Track Changes in
Their FinancialCosts and Benefits?
Assuming that shareholders and attorneys rationally decide to
pursue derivative actions based on an ex ante financial cost-benefit
analysis, the rate of derivative litigation should closely track changes
in Japan's institutional structure that impact the financial costs and
benefits of pursing derivative actions. In other words, if rational
profit-seeking shareholders and attorneys are driving derivative
litigation, the rate of derivative actions should increase as they

206.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 369.
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become more profitable and decrease as they become less profitable.
However, since the 1993 reduction in the stamp fee, empirical
evidence suggests the opposite. The rate of derivative litigation over
the past decade has declined in spite of a number of post-1993
modifications to Japan's derivative actions regime that arguably
make Japanese derivative litigation more profitable. 20 9 This is yet
another piece of evidence that suggests something other than profit is
driving derivative litigation in Japan.
The first major change in the cost structure of post-1993
derivative actions relates to orders by Japanese courts for
shareholder-plaintiffs to post security for expenses. According to
Articles 267(6) and (7) of the Commercial Code (now Article 847(7)
and (8) of the Company Law of 2005), upon a defendant's motion, in
the course of a derivative action Japanese courts can order plaintiffshareholders to post security for expenses. 210 For the defendant to
succeed in such a motion they must establish on a prima facie basis
that the derivative action was filed in "bad faith. '21 ' Several
prominent scholars claim that after the rate of derivative litigation
increased in the early nineties, Japanese courts began to more freely
award security for expenses in order to deter strike suits. 212 The ease
with which Japanese courts awarded security for costs was widely
regarded as a significant financial barrier to derivative litigation in
213
the post-1993 period following the reduction in the stamp fee.
Then, in 1997, the Osaka High Court issued what many academics
view as a watershed judgment that "served to check a growing
tendency by courts to grant liberally defendants' motions for security
for expenses. '2 14 Several prominent scholars opined that the
tightening of security for expense awards "set an important precedent
'215
for further expanding the use of shareholder derivative suits.
Empirical evidence from the DA Database only partially
confirms the widely understood role played by security for expenses
in the post-1993 era.2 16 Indeed, in the period immediately following
the reduction of the stamp fee until the date of the Osaka High Court
watershed decision, the Japanese courts awarded security for

209.
See infra Part IV.C; Infra Appendix A, Table 1.
210.
Fujita, supra note 6, at 21.
211.
Id.; Utsumi, supra note 107, at 137.
212.
Aronson, supra note 1, at 25-26; Fujita, supranote 6, at 21; Kawashima &
Sakurai, supranote 4, at 41-45.
213.
Aronson, supra note 1, at 24-25. See generally Fujita, supra note 6, at 2122 ("Defendants of a derivative action almost always seek the said bond, and the order
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214.
Aronson, supra note 1, at 25-26.
215.
Id.
216.
For detailed statistics on actions in which security for expenses was
ordered, see infra Appendix B, Table 8.
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expenses in 30.4 percent of derivative actions filed. 217 After the Osaka
High Court decision the percentage of derivative actions in which
2 18
courts awarded security for expenses plummeted to 7.3 percent.
Thus, the DA Database confirms the general understanding that the
Osaka High Court decision ushered in a more restrictive use of
security for expenses, which arguably increased the profitability of
derivative litigation. However, contrary to the economically motivated
and rational shareholder theory and the predictions of several
prominent academics, the number of derivative actions filed in the
decade following the Osaka Court's watershed decision did not
increase. To the contrary, it declined.
The second hallmark event in Japan's post-1993 derivative
219
actions cost-benefit structure was the 2001 Daiwa Bank decision.
In Daiwa Bank, the Osaka District Court awarded damages of $775
million in a derivative action-sixty-six times higher than the
previous record. 220 Leading academics and reporters suggested that
the "Daiwa shock" may lead to a flood of derivative actions.2 2 1 Indeed,
Japanese companies rushed to purchase or increase their D&O
liability insurance.2 22 From an economically motivated and rational
choice perspective, the Daiwa shock should have produced a sharp
increase in derivative litigation. 223 Again, the reality contradicts
what the economically motivated and rational choice theory predicts.
Since the time of the Daiwa Bank decision, the number of derivative
224
actions filed has slightly declined.
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Finally, some leading scholars suggest that the steep decline in
the Japanese market likely decreased the transaction cost of pursuing
derivative actions by making it easier to establish damages resulting
from director misconduct. 225 From an economically motivated and
rational choice perspective, this suggests that in the years that the
Japanese market was at its lowest point and declined most sharply
there should have been a proliferation in derivative litigation. Again,
such a prediction based on the economically motivated and rational
choice theory has proven incorrect. In 2003 and 2009, the Japanese
stock market declined sharply and hit post-bubble lows at
approximately 25 percent of its 1989 bubble peak.2 26 However, in
each of those years the number of derivative actions filed in Japan
2 27
was similar, if not lower, than in most other years.
In sum, from an economically motivated and rational choice
perspective, the three most significant events in the post-1993 costbenefit structure of Japanese derivative litigation all point to an
expected increase in the number of derivative actions filed. According
to the economically motivated and rational choice theory, the
combined effect of all three of these events should have caused a
surge in derivative litigation during the past-decade. In fact, the
opposite happened. This should not surprise. As demonstrated above,
even with the changes in the cost-benefit structure of derivative
litigation, Japanese derivative actions still do not financially benefit
228
either shareholders or attorneys.
The conclusion is simple. There is scant evidence that those who
participate in Japanese derivative actions are driven by profits. To
the contrary, it appears that even though shareholders and attorneys
normally do not gain significant financial benefits from derivative
litigation they still decide to sue.
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West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1498. See
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V. PROVIDING A RATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR NON-ECONOMICALLY
MOTIVATED AND IRRATIONAL DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN JAPAN

A. Demarcatingthe Boundaries Between Rational and
IrrationalBehavior
According to the classical economic rational choice theory, any
behavior that does not directly maximize an actor's financial wealth
is irrational. 229 Thus, in the context of derivative litigation, it is
irrational for a shareholder or attorney to pursue a derivative action
if, based on an ex ante financial cost-benefit analysis, the cost of a
derivative action outweighs the benefit. 230 According to this
definition, as demonstrated above, it is normally irrational to pursue
derivative actions in Japan.
Although this realization is academically important, it is not
terribly helpful for providing a more accurate understanding of what
precisely drives derivative litigation in Japan. To provide such an
understanding, particular types of non-economically motivated and
irrational behaviors, which help to explain why Japanese derivative
litigation is regularly pursued, need to be explored. The starting point
for such an analysis is to recognize that there are two relatively
distinct categories of shareholder-attorney behavior: (1) quasirational behavior; and (2) purely irrational behavior.
Quasi-rational behavior is behavior that does not directly
maximize an actor's financial wealth but which nevertheless
increases the actor's overall level of well-being because, in a global
sense, the benefit derived from the behavior is greater than the cost.
For example, in a narrow sense, giving money to charity is
economically irrational from the perspective of the classical economic
rational choice theory as it is a financial wealth reducing behavior.
However, it is likely that the philanthropist's overall well-being is
enhanced by philanthropy because the altruistic benefits gained from
donating are greater than the reduction in her well-being caused by
the financial loss. Such behavior is labeled "quasi-rational" because
although the action is irrational in a narrow financial sense it is still
in the actor's self-interest to undertake the action.
Purely irrational behaviors are those behaviors which do not
benefit the actor's overall level of well-being in the sense that the
global costs of the behavior outweigh its benefits (i.e., such behavior
is not in the individual's self-interest). The field of behavioral law and
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economics has been instrumental in explaining why people engage in
such utility-reducing behaviors. The most prominent explanation for
a considerable amount of purely irrational behavior comes from
Herbert Simon's theory of bounded rationality. 231 According to this
theory the ability for individuals to act rationally (i.e., in a way that
maximizes what is in their self-interest) is limited by the information
they have, their limited cognitive abilities, and the finite amount of
time they have to make decisions. 232 As a result of such limitations,
which Simon coined "bounded rationality," individuals often engage
in suboptimal or utility-decreasing behavior. 233 For example, people
often decide to spend their hard earned money in shops or
restaurants because they are full of customers. Most people engage in
or
such behavior because they rarely have the time, information 234
ability to compare the value offered by all competing businesses.
However, the use of such a mental heuristic can often lead a customer
into receiving a suboptimal amount of value for the amount of money
spent.
When analyzing derivative litigation in Japan through the lens
of quasi-rational and purely irrational behaviors, a large portion of
seemingly inexplicable derivative litigation makes sense. In fact,
according to the empirical evidence, it appears that a majority of
derivative litigation can be directly traced to quasi-rational and
purely irrational behavior. This is in stark contrast to attempting to
understand derivative litigation in Japan solely through the lens of
as
behavior which,
motivated and rational
economically
demonstrated above, has at best, a limited predictive value, and at
worst, is terribly misleading.
B. Quasi-RationalBehavior Drives Derivative Litigation in Japan
At first blush, the fact that there are no obvious direct financial
incentives for pursuing derivative actions in Japan may suggest that
litigants do not benefit from such actions. In fact, the opposite is true.
A significant portion of Japanese derivative actions ultimately benefit
the litigants who pursue them. However, the benefits that many
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derivative litigants receive are not monetary benefits that directly
flow from the derivative action itself. Rather, these litigants pay an
economic price to use derivative actions as a tool to receive a myriad
of economic and non-economic benefits that indirectly flow from
derivative litigation.2 35 Ultimately, based on a wider definition of
rationality, these seemingly "irrational" litigants may be seen as
engaging in "rational" behavior in the sense that by pursuing
derivative litigation they advance their overall well-being.
Based on our review of over 200 reported decisions, 1,000 actions
filed, and numerous discussions with leading Japanese academics
and attorneys, three groups of litigants emerge who repeatedly
pursue derivative actions in Japan for the primary purpose of
receiving such non-economic or indirect-economic benefits: (1) Activist
Attorneys, (2) sokaiya, and (3) environmentalists. 236 These three
groups of litigants account for a major portion of the market for
derivative actions in Japan and have been involved in an even larger
2 37
percentage of high-profile derivative actions.
The most significant portion of derivative actions driven by
quasi-rational litigants are those involving Activist Attorneys. As
explained in the previous Part, Activist Attorneys represent
shareholder-plaintiffs in their capacity as members of the Kabunushi
Onbuzuman (Shareholders Ombudsman) (KO). 2 38 From the time it
was founded in 1996, the KO has been a non-profit organization with
a fierce political agenda. 239 The organization was founded by a group
of 150 lawyers, accountants, and academics in response to the
2 40
government's use of taxpayer money to bail out corporate lenders.
According to its charter, the objective of the KO is to exercise
shareholders' legal rights, improve corporate information disclosure,
and serve as a voice for the expression of shareholder opinion. 241 Its
published materials express an even broader political agenda:
"[M]onitoring corporate activities, criticizing antisocial acts by
corporations ...[and promoting] those corporations that improve
working conditions, practice philanthropy, protect the environment,
employ the handicapped, promote gender-equality, and engage in full
'
disclosure of their activities. "242

235.
See infra Part V.B.
236.
See infra Part V.B.
237.
See infra Part V.B.
238.
See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
239.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 178-81
(discussing the KO's history as a non-profit and its success in bringing derivative
suits); KO Charter,supranote 205, art. 2; KO WEBSITE, supra note 152.
240.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 178-79; KO Charter,
supra note 205, art. 2; KO WEBSITE, supra note 152.
241.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 35, at 178-79.
242.
KO Charter,supra note 205, art. 2; KO WEBSITE, supranote 152.
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To achieve its vast political agenda, the KO undertakes a litany
of activist activities, which include running a website and telephone
hotlines, lobbying the government for legislative reforms, organizing
243
shareholder voting campaigns, and filing shareholder proposals.
However, the most powerful weapon in the KO's arsenal is its use of
derivative actions against corporations who oppose its suggested
reforms and political agenda. 24 4 In order to facilitate such actions the
KO holds a portfolio of 300 shares and has a number of shareholders
245
and Activist Attorneys as regular members.
The scale of the KO's impact on Japan's market for derivative
actions cannot be understated. In the post-1993 period, actions
brought by the KO's Activist Attorneys accounted for half of all
246
reported settlements and a quarter of successful derivative actions.
In addition, KO attorneys have litigated a disproportionate number of
high-profile derivative actions cases. 24 7 The role of the KO in Japan's
derivative actions market has not gone unnoticed. Milhaupt describes
the KO's use of derivative actions "as arguably the most important
corporate law enforcement agent in ... Japan." 24 8 West also
acknowledges that the KO "dominates the market [for derivative
actions], has no recognizable equal, and has litigated several of the
249
more high profile cases in Japan."
KO cases are clearly motivated by politics, not profits. Its charter
makes it clear that its goal is political activism. 250 From its inception,
any fees received by senior attorneys working on KO cases have been
donated back to the organization in order to fund its various activist
campaigns. 25 1 The amount KO attorneys charge shareholder litigants
is normally substantially below the market rate. 252 In spite of the
complexities of incorporating a non-profit organization in Japan, the

KO Charter,supra note 205; KO WEBSITE, supra note 152.
243.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 179 (discussing
244.
the KO's successful use of derivative suits).
245.
Id.
Infra Appendix B, Table 1.
246.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 179 ("Given the
247.
legal nature of its work, specialist members in the form of elite attorneys are the core
of the organization."); KO Charter,supra note 205; KO WEBSITE, supranote 152.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 35, at 170-71.
248.
West, Why ShareholdersSue, supra note 127, at 369.
249.
250.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 35, at 179 (outlining the
KO's political goals and non-profit status); KO Charter, supra note 205. See generally
KO WEBSITE, supra note 152.
251.
Some of the junior lawyers receive small amounts of remuneration for
working on cases but this is no different from any other non-profit organization.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 35, at 179.
252.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 369.
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KO officially changed its corporate status to a non-profit organization
in 2003.253
The KO's non-profit motivation is evident in the manner in
which its Activist Attorneys conduct derivative litigation. The cases
they choose to litigate always have a clear political agenda matching
the organization's goals. 254 As explained previously, Activist
Attorneys on average claim one-tenth the amount of damages and
settle for one-fifth the amount when compared to other derivative
actions.2 55 This suggests that Activist Attorneys may be achieving a
high rate of settlement because they are more concerned with the
message sent by a settlement than monetary gains. This hypothesis is
confirmed by the fact that many of the settlements entered into by
Activist Attorneys require commitments from the company to
improve corporate governance. 2 6 In short, Activist Attorneys acting
on the KO's behalf demonstrate that quasi-rationality is a major force
driving derivative litigation in Japan.
The sokaiya have long played an infamous role in Japanese
corporate governance. With their strong ties to the yakuza (the
Japanese mafia), the sokaiya have historically used various means,
including threats to disclose sensitive corporate information and
disrupt annual general meetings, to extort payments from Japanese
companies. 25 7 Over the past several decades, the sokaiya have been
extremely successful in their corporate extortion, extracting hundreds
of millions of dollars from Japan's most venerable blue-chip
258
companies.
The DA Database also suggests that the sokaiya utilize
derivative actions as a tool for extortion. Sokaiya involvement was
259
identified in approximately 5 percent of derivative actions filed.

253.
KO Purpose,supra note 204.
254.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 180-81
(discussing KO's derivative suit settlements); KO Charter, supra note 205. See
generally KO WEBSITE, supra note 205.
255.
See infra Appendix B, Tables 6-7.
256.
Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 35, at 180.
257.
See West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion, supra note 6, at 767
(discussing the history of the sokaiya in extorting payments from Japanese companies).
258.
See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 374-75 (noting that
the sokaiya's use of threats and settlements "can help sokaiya reap significant
rewards"). See generallyWest, Information, Institutions, and Extortion, supra note 6, at
768-69 (discussing survey's finding that "of two thousand firms... seventy-seven
percent had paid sokaiya").
259.
The Authors approximated the percentage of cases that were brought by
sokaiya by crosschecking the names of the plaintiffs in the DA Database against names
of well-known sokaiya. Although Japanese corporate law specialists generally agree on
which plaintiffs are sokaiya there is obviously no official list of sokaiya because, like
members of any criminal organization, a person acting as a sokaiya will most often
want to conceal or deny their identity to the general public. The Authors were
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Normally, the sokaiya own a minimal amount of shares and therefore
choose to incur the financial cost of hiring an attorney with no
realistic chance of achieving a direct financial benefit from the
derivative action. 260 However, the court serves as a potential forum
for the sokaiya to disclose sensitive corporate information, and raises
the possibility of the company discretely "paying-off' the sokaiya to
rid itself of the nuisance suits. 26 1 Thus, quasi-rational extortion
accounts for another portion of the market for Japanese derivative
litigation.
Environmentalists make up the final group of litigants that
bring derivative suits for quasi-rational motives. Litigants with
environmental motives were found in about 2 percent of the actions in
the DA Database. 262 Most commonly, these actions have involved
cases brought by environmentalists-turned-shareholders against the
directors of electric power companies for their decisions to build
nuclear power plants. 263 The fee paid by the environmentalists to
pursue a derivative action is "economically irrational" in a narrow

conservative in generating their list of which plaintiffs were sokaiya (i.e., if the
plaintiffs were not widely viewed as sokaiya among Japanese corporate law specialists
they were not considered to be sokaiya). It should be noted that the Authors have
received anonymous feedback that the amount of sokaiya-linked cases may be much
higher than estimated (i.e., greater than 5 percent) as certain plaintiffs which we did
not label as sokaiya actually may be sokaiya and that sokaiya may have been involved
in cases where the parties' names were not reported (which in Japan is more common
than in many other jurisdictions). Due to the opaque and uncertain nature of the
evidence the Authors considered these anonymous comments but chose to maintain the
more conservative estimate of sokaiya involvement (i.e., not counting plaintiffs as
sokaiya where the affiliation was uncertain and excluding all cases in which parties'
names were not reported) due to the opaque nature of the evidence.
According to the Tokyo District Court a "so-called sokaiya is a person who
260.
holds a small number of shares in some corporations in order to extort money [on some
" T6kyo Chih5 Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Aug. 28, 1965, 7 KAKYO
pretext] ....
SAIBANSHO KEIJI SAIBAN REISHO [KAKEISHO] 1712 (Japan). As a sokaiya must only hold
a single share to file a derivative action for the purpose of extortion (i.e., with the hope
of receiving an under-the-table personal payment to abandon the derivative action
brought on behalf of the company) there is no need for them to own more than a single
share. In fact, owning more than a single share would be against the sokaiya's selfinterest as it would increase the cost for them to engage in extortion without any
additional payoff.
See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 375 (noting that high
261.
response costs and potential public release of information lead corporations to pay to
get rid of nuisance suits).
262.
The Authors approximated the percentage of cases that were brought for
environmental motives by calculating the percentage of cases in the DA Database that
were brought for a purely environmental motive (e.g., where the plaintiff purchased a
share in an electric power company after the decision was made to build a nuclear
power plant to provide the plaintiff with standing to sue the company's directors). Such
cases made up approximately 2 percent of cases in the DA database.
263.
West noted these cases. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at
372. The DA Database suggests that there have been more since his article.
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sense (as such environmentalists generally hold a miniscule amount
of shares and no environmental cases have succeeded thus far)2 64, but
likely makes sense from a publicity perspective, as the lawsuits bring
265
attention to their cause.
Based on the reported cases in the DA Database, the three
groups of quasi-rational litigants account for more than a quarter of
derivative litigation in Japan. It is extremely likely that there are
significantly more derivative actions in which plaintiffs are driven by
quasi-rational motives-but the precise number of such plaintiffs is
difficult to determine, as quasi-rational motives are often only known
to the plaintiffs themselves. Based on this evidence alone, there is no
doubt that behavior, which classical economic rational choice
adherents describe as "irrational," has been a major driver of
derivative litigation in Japan. It also demonstrates that non-economic
motives, which have received scant attention in the comparative
shareholder litigation literature, play a vitally important role in
derivative litigation in Japan.
C. Purely IrrationalBehavior as a PotentialDriver
of Derivative Litigation in Japan
Derivative litigation is exceedingly complex. Indeed, months
were invested in this Article for data collection, case reviews, and
regression analysis to develop an accurate picture of the forces that
drive derivative litigation in Japan. There is little chance that any
shareholder or attorney contemplating pursuing a Japanese
derivative action would spend a fraction of this time to figure out
their statistical probability of success. Indeed, this Article suggests
that even highly skilled legal scholars fundamentally misperceive
Japanese derivative actions as being profitable-when in fact, they
normally are not. 26 6 In such a complex decision making environment,
in which the actual probability of success is opaque, the forces of
"bounded rationality" loom large.
Decision researchers have identified the complexity of a decision
as the leading reason that actors abandon thorough cost-benefit

264.
The Authors reviewed all of the environmental cases in the DA Database
and performed an additional search in the LEX/DB database on October 12, 2011 to
confirm that, at least in terms of reported cases, there is no environmentally motived
derivative action that has succeeded (i.e., all cases have failed where the plaintiff has
purchased a share in a company to pursue a derivative action for a purely
environmental motive). The Authors are also unaware of any environmentally
motivated unreported derivative action that has succeeded.
265.
The Authors ran electronic searches on Japanese newspaper databases on
October 11, 2011 and found that the environmentally motivated derivative actions
cases generated a significant number of published stories in the Japanese news media.
266.
See supra Part II.B.
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analyses in favor of more simplified decision making strategies
(which are commonly referred to as "mental heuristics").267 Although
simplified decision-making strategies may result in sub-optimal
decisions, they are commonly used because actors lack the time,
cognitive ability, or information to conduct a more thorough analysis
(i.e., the actors have "bounded rationality"). Thus, behavioral law and
economics predicts that when actors face a complex decision, they will
commonly rely on a mental heuristic that results in irrational
26 8
behavior.
One of the most common mental heuristics that actors rely on
'26 9
when faced with complex decisions is the "availability heuristic.
According to cognitive research, the availability heurstic commonly
causes actors to overestimate the relevance of salient or memorable
events. 270 Instead of making their decisions based on the actual
probability of an event occurring, they base their decisions upon the
probability of the event occurring according to their memory. 2 71 Such
a mental shortcut can often lead to sub-optimal decisions, as events
that are vivid or well publicized leave the actor with the impression
that the event is more likely to occur than actual statistical
272
probability would suggest.
There are several pieces of evidence that suggest that a portion
of derivative litigation in Japan is the result of irrational behavior by
shareholders and attorneys who were misguided by the "availability
heuristic." In 1986, the Tokyo District Court's Mitsui Mining decision
was a vivid event that drastically altered the public's view of

267.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1077-78 (discussing evidence
showing that the complexity of a decision is the leading cause of departures from
complete cost-benefit analysis).
268.
See id. (discussing people's deviations from rational choice theory when
confronted with complex decisions).
269.
Id. at 1085-91.
270.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1087; Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability,
JUDGMENT

UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS

AND BIASES

163,

163-64

(Daniel

Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
271.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1087 (discussing studies on the
availability heuristic, such as the impact of media coverage, on people's estimates of
the number of deaths from various causes); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 270, at
163-64 (noting that people's decisions are often influenced by the strength of
association, i.e., the familiarity of a given event).
272.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1087 ("This mental shortcut can
often lead to estimates that approximate statistical probabilities, as memorable events
can be memorable precisely because they are common."); Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 270, at 163-64 (arguing that when availability is influenced by factors that are
not related to the actual frequency of a particular event, the use of this heuristic will
lead to systematic biases).
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derivative litigation. 27 3 The decision was widely seen as a seachanging event, as it was the first time in Japanese history that a
court found in favor of a plaintiff in a derivative action. 274 The media
275
hype and academic fervor surrounding the decision were enormous.
It quickly transformed the Japanese derivative action from an
obscure and impotent artifact of the American occupation to being
perceived as an effective tool for increasing shareholder wealth and
improving corporate performance. 276 The revived status of the
derivative action was made clear in 1990, when it captured the
spotlight in the high-level U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments
Initiative negotiations-which further increased the positive image of
derivative litigation. 277 The interest in derivative actions reached a
fever pitch in the spring of 1993 when the first book devoted entirely
to derivative actions-a mass-marketed account of the derivative

273.
See West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1499500 (noting the massive publicity generated by the Mitsui Mining decision and the
potential implications of such a "publicity effect").
274.
Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17-18; West, Pricing Shareholder
Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1499-500.
275.
See West, Pricing Shareholder Derivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1499500 ("massive publicity"). Prior to the 1993 reduction in the stamp fee, there were a
number of publications that illustrate the important impact that the Mitsui Mining
decision had on the psyche of the legal community and wider public in Japan. See
Hiroshi Haruta, Kabushiki-sogo-hoyu-kisei to kogaisha-houjinkaku-MitsuiKozan jiken
to genko-hosei (ge) [Regulation on Cross-Shareholding and Legal Personality of
Subsidiary: Mitsui Mining Co. Case and Current Legal Regime], 1206 SHOJI HOMU 12
(1990) (Japan); Hiroshi Haruta, Kabushiki-sogo-hoyu-kisei to kogaisha-houjinkakuMitsui Kozan jiken to genko-hosei Go) [Regulation on Cross-Shareholdingand Legal
Personality of Subsidiary: Mitsui Mining Co. Case and Current Legal Regime], 1205
SHOJI HOMU 2 (1990) (Japan); Hideki Kanda, Mitsui Kozan jiken ni kansuru rirontekimondai [Theoretical Problems in Mitsui Mining Co. Case], 1082 SHOJI HOMU 2 (1986)
(Japan); Mitsuo Kondo, Jikokabushikisyutoku to torishimariyaku no sekinin-Mitsui
Kozan jiken kousoshin hanketsu wo megutte [Stock Repurchase and Liability of
Directors: High Court's Judgment on Mitsui Mining Co. Case], 1190 SHOJI HOMU 51
(Japan); Toshihiko
Seki, Kogaisha niyoru oyakaisha-kabushiki no
(1989)
shutoku/baikyaku kara shojita songai to oyakaisha no torishimariyaku ni taisuru
daihyo-sosho-Mitsui Kozan jiken hanketsu (Tokyo Chisai showa 61. 5. 29) ga shisasuru aratana ronten [Damages Due to Purchase and Sale of Shares in Parent
Corporation by a Subsidiary, and Derivative Action against Directors of Parent
Corporation:New Points suggested by the Judgment in Mitsui Mining Co. Case (Tokyo
District Court on May 29 of 1986)], 869 JURIST 88 (1986) (Japan); Souich Shida,
Kanzen-kogaisha niyoru oyakaisha-kabushiki no shutoku ni kanyoshita oyakaisha no
torishimariyaku no songaibaisho-sekinin-MitsuiKozan jiken hanketsu [Liability of
Parent Corporation'sDirectors Who Purchased Shares in the Parent by the 100 Percent
Subsidiary:Mitsui Mining Co. Case], 62 WASEDA HOGAKU 137 (1987) (Japan).
Supra note 275; see Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17-18
276.
(detailing the increase in derivative suits following Mitsui Mining).
277.
See West, Pricingof ShareholderDerivative Actions, supra note 1, at 1499500 (stating that shareholder rights generally, and derivative actions specifically, were
a "focus of discussion" in the United States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative
negotiations).
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litigation explosion-was published by the editors of Nihon Keizai
2 78
Shimbun (the Japanese equivalent of the Wall Street Journal).
However, despite the media hype and reversal in public
perception, the Mitsui Mining decision had scant impact on the
economic reality of derivative litigation in Japan. It did nothing to
change the Shareholder Cost and Benefit Rules, Loser Pays Rule or
lack of U.S.-style contingency fees. The court's decision merely
required nineteen directors to pay approximately $30,000 each to the
multi-billion dollar Mitsui Mining conglomerate-an amount that had
2 79
no material impact on the company's profitability or stock price.
The decision was immediately appealed, and thus within months any
marginal impact that the successful judgment may have had on the
financial cost-benefit calculus for pursuing derivative litigation was
thrown into doubt. 280 Moreover, the shareholder-plaintiff who
brought the Mitsui Mining action only owned a token amount of
shares, which ensured that he never directly profited from the
action. 28 1 As such, in reality, the Mitsui Mining decision confirmed
that derivative litigation was not a viable tool for shareholders to
make profits and perhaps was only useful for grabbing media
attention. Following the Mitsui Mining decision, the stark economic
reality of Japan's derivative action was dramatically different from
the image depicted in the media of the derivative action as a profit
maximizing corporate governance mechanism.
Even though the media-hype was misguided, the Mitsui Mining
decision's impact on the Japanese psyche proved important.
Following the media-hyped decision, derivative litigation increased
sharply. 28 2 This appears to be a classic example of the powerful effect
of the "availability heuristic." Although, the financial cost-benefit
reality of profiting from derivative litigation barely changed, the
altered view of the derivative action in the minds of shareholders and
attorneys led them irrationally to sue. Indeed, the reliance of

278.
NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, supra note 116.
279.
Mizuno v. Ariyoshi (Mitsui Mining), Thky5 ChihO Saibansho [Tokyo Dist.
Ct.] May 29, 1986, 1194 HANJI 33, affl'd, Toky6 KSto Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] July 3,
1989, 1188 SHOJI HOMU 36, aff'd, Saik5 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 9, 1993, 47 MINSHO
4814 (Japan); see also Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17-18 ("The court held
the management liable, finding that the loss resulted from the management's actions
in violation of the Article 210 provision prohibiting the corporate repurchase of
shares.").
280.
Mitsui Mining, Tokyo Dist. Ct., 1194 HANJI 33.
281.
See also Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 40 (discussing that
shareholder-plaintiff in Mitsui Mining acquired shares only after finding misconduct,
and only brought suit to become famous so that he would make more fees as an
attorney in the future).
282.
Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 4, at 17-18 (noting the increase in suits
after the Mitsui Mining decision).
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shareholders and attorneys on the "availability heuristic" provides a
credible explanation for the sharp increase in pre-1993 derivative
litigation-an explanation which has largely been overlooked in the
literature.
Although the Mitsui Mining decision sparked an irrational
exuberance for derivative litigation in Japan, the success of Activist
Attorneys has kept the fire alive. As explained earlier, Activist
Attorneys are extremely successful derivative litigants. 28 3 In
addition, the KO organization magnifies the success of Activist
Attorneys through its active publicity-seeking activities. 28 4 Such
publicity seems to have fabricated the impression, even among
leading academics, that derivative actions are profitable ventures.
Indeed, West has concluded that the KO organization is profit
maximizing and that that there "is profit to be found" by engaging in
285
derivative litigation in Japan.
However, as explained above, in terms of profitability, the
success rate of Activist Attorneys is little more than smoke and
mirrors. The manner in which Activist Attorneys conduct these
derivative actions may result in success which creates the impression
of profitability-but the attorneys do not actually profit. They conduct
derivative actions as would be expected by attorneys acting for a nonprofit organization-accepting below market retainers, claiming
below market damages and accepting below market settlements-in
the furtherance of a political agenda. 28 6 The public has scant
knowledge of these facts, and indeed, they were largely unknown to
the majority of academics before the empirical analysis for this
Article was conducted. As such, the false impression of profitability
propagated by the KO further amplifies the likelihood of irrational
litigation based on the availability heuristic.
A small survey conducted by West in 2001 provides some
tentative empirical evidence that the availability heuristic may be
creating irrational exuberance in shareholder-plaintiffs. 287 The
survey was conducted on ten individual shareholder-plaintiffs who
were pursing derivative actions against directors of large public

283.
See supra text accompanying note 197.
284.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 179-81
(discussing various publicity seeking activities that the KO have engaged in to promote
their political agenda).
285.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 370-71 (noting that the
KO organizational structure chosen by the leads to profit maximization).
286.
See Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 35, at 179-81 (outlining
the non-profit behavior of the KO).
287.
See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, at 373 (finding that all
ten shareholder-plaintiffs interviewed believed that they would obtain a large
settlement and would incur no monetary costs).
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corporations. 288 West asked the shareholder-plaintiffs to evaluate
their chance of success. 289 Although, as West notes, such a small
informal survey is hardly scientific, the answers provided by the
shareholder-plaintiffs are telling. 290 One hundred percent of the
shareholder-plaintiffs indicated that they expected to win or obtain a
large settlement from their derivative action. 291 Based on the DA
Database, the shareholder-plaintiffs' perceived rate of success is
approximately 200 percent higher than what the empirical evidence
suggests the actual success rate is. 292 Thus, the shareholderplaintiffs' belief that they would either win or receive a large
settlement is unsupported by our empirical evidence.
An alternative explanation for these shareholders' irrational
exuberance, based on a common phenomenon observed by cognitive
psychologists, is that the plaintiff-shareholders may be irrationally
engaging in derivative litigation as a result of an "overconfidence
bias. ' 293 Even when actors know the actual probability of a particular
event, which theoretically is possible for the shareholder-plaintiffs
(but unlikely), actors tend to predict that they will perform better
than average. 294 Of course, definitively proving that the plaintiffshareholders in West's limited survey were either irrationally acting
on the availability heuristic or overconfidence bias is impossible.
However, their answers do leave the distinct impression that their
decision to pursue derivative litigation was at least partially
irrational.
Finally, Professor Mitsuo Kondo, who is widely considered
Japan's top derivative actions scholar, suggested in a recent interview
that the dramatic increase in derivative litigation in the 1990s was "a
kind of fashion," and the slight decline over the last decade has
occurred because the "fashion boom has gone away." 295 Kondo's
insightful comments raise the prospect that yet another type of

288.
Id.
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
291.
Id.
292.
See infra Appendix B, Table 1.
293.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1091-95; see also Christine Jolls,
Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653,
1659 & n.22 (1998) ("[P]eople are often unrealistically optimistic about the probability
that bad things will happen to them."); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (finding that
students rate their own chances of positive events higher than average, and rate
negative events below average).
294.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 16, at 1091-92.
295.
The interview was done by Masafumi Nakahigashi for the purpose of our
joint project on derivative actions in Japan. Interview by Masafumi Nakahigashi with
Mitsuo Kondo, in Osaka, Japan (Feb. 23, 2010).
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irrational behavior may account for at least a portion of the rate of
derivative litigation in Japan.
Recently, a significant amount of research in behavioral
economics suggests that irrational herding behavior may be
responsible for a wide array of difficult to explain behaviors, from
cultural fads and fashion, to stock market bubbles. 296 According to
this theory, the occurrence of a single event may cause a subtle shift
in behavior that other actors successively copy, thus resulting in a
significant irrational trend that occurs without a corresponding
change in the economic value of that behavior. 297 Although herding
behavior theory has yet to be applied in the context of litigation,
Kondo's observation appears to coincide with this theory-especially
considering the highly publicized events in the late 1980s that
immediately preceded the upsurge in derivative litigation in Japan.
In sum, it is difficult to estimate the exact percentage of Japan's
market for derivative actions that can be attributed to purely
irrational behavior. However, there is enough available evidence to
confidently suggest that purely irrational behavior has played more
than a marginal role in driving derivative litigation in Japan. More
investigation is needed, but it is clear that the lens of irrationality
must be used to accurately understand Japanese derivative litigation.

VI. VALUABLE LESSONS FROM AN UNDERSTANDING
OF NON-ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED AND
IRRATIONAL SHAREHOLDER LITIGANTS

The point is simple: non-economic motives and irrational
behavior are major drivers of derivative litigation in Japan. This is an
important academic discovery, as much of the literature on
shareholder litigation is built on the erroneous assumption that noneconomic motives and irrational behavior are of little consequence.
The idea that shareholder litigation may thrive on a significant scale
with a disregard for direct financial gains, or even when such
litigation is against the plaintiffs (and plaintiff-attorney's) selfinterest, opens up a new field of scholarship to explore.
This is not to suggest that the financial costs of litigation do not
matter. Obviously, if the cost is exorbitantly high, it will likely

296.
See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 149-53 (2000)
(suggesting that herd-like behavior causes an "information cascade," whereby one
actor's choice influences others, ultimately impacting mispricing in financial markets).
297.
See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 1014 (1992)
("[Clascades can cause individuals to converge on the wrong decision... because an
initial cascade may aggregate very little information.").
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prevent non-economically motivated derivative actions from occurring
as the cost of achieving the non-monetary reward may be too high.
However, this Article provides evidence indicating that even when a
jurisdiction's shareholder litigation framework does not make it
rational to sue (i.e., when suing may be against both the
shareholder's and attorney's self-interests) there is still the potential
for a significant amount of litigation to occur. This suggests that the
common approach of viewing shareholder litigation solely through the
narrow lens of economic motives and rational behavior should be
abandoned and replaced with a wider lens that includes non-economic
motives and irrational behavior.
On a more pragmatic note, the revelation that non-economic
motives and irrational behavior are driving Japanese derivative
actions poses important difficulties for reform. If non-economic
motives drive derivative litigation then it is not enough to merely
tweak the financial cost-benefit structure of a country's derivative
action regime to achieve the appropriate level of derivative litigation
to promote good corporate governance. In a similar vein, if irrational
behavior drives derivative litigation then the public perception of the
derivative action may be just as important (if not more important)
than its actual regulatory design or economics.
The realization that non-economic motives and irrational
behavior may drive derivative litigation also has powerful
implications for Germany and China. These two leading economies
have both recently implemented derivative actions. 298 As a result of
their shared civil law heritage with Japan, they both have features
(e.g., litigation fees that are contingent on the amount of damages
claimed, a Loser Pays Rule, limited pre-trial discovery, and limited
use of contingency fees) that, from an economically motivated and
rational choice perspective, suggest their new derivative actions will
be impotent. 29 9 However, Japan's experience suggests otherwise. This
Article demonstrates that even in an environment where the direct
financial benefit of derivative litigation is outweighed by its cost,
derivative actions can still prove to have a powerful effect on
corporate governance and society as a whole.
Finally, the United States may want to consider the possibility
that its derivative actions scholarship deserves a second look. The
nearly universal focus on how various legal rules and institutional
factors affect the financial cost-benefit calculus for shareholder
litigation may have left some important stones unturned. The role of
non-economic motives in driving Japanese derivative litigation also
suggests that large contingency fee payments, often seen as critical to

298.
299.

Supra note 11.
See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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the viability of America's derivative litigation regime, 30 0 may be
unnecessary. Finally, the growing battle between Main Street and
Wall Street suggests that an American version of the KO may soon
bring a wave of non-economically motivated derivative actions to its
shores.

300.

Baum & Puchniak, supranote 31.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1
Number of Cases of Shareholders' Derivative Actions in Japan

High Court

District Court

Total

Newly
Filed
N/A
____
N/A

Proceedi On
Newly Proceeding
ng Ended Proceeding iled Ended
N/A
N/A
N/A
10

On
Proceeding
76

Newly
Filed
N/A

Proceeding
Ended
NIA

On Proceeding

N/A

10

N/A

N/A

129

N/A

NIA

139

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

148

N/A

N/A

162

12

13

14
I
13

68

66

150

80

79

163

11
__
17
_
15

9

15

8

66

172

99

75

187

18

14

73

59

186

90

77

00

11

18

95

77

204

110

8

222

31

29

20

84

99

189

115

128

209

S1113 20014f
+-Ril144V

28

26

22

66

87

168

94

113

190

9

22

78

105

141

87

114

163

'11D15*

N/A

N/A

N/A

85

76

150

N/A

/A

SF-1164

N//A

N/A

N/A

78

100

128

N/A

N/A

N/A

20044-1--nil17

NA

/A

N/A

70

1

107

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

72

77

102

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

70

50

122

N/A

N/A

/A

"MZ5*
1993
T61F
1994&F
'/7J
1995WKOi8
19964F
T709W
1997
Wil101998
TO 11
1999w1 R 1 2M

86

200__

2002*
2003

N/A

I

20051F
*-M/Z184F
20061-

'-+t194
20074
SA204-

_

_

N/A

IA

/A

64

46

140

N/A

/A

N/A

IA

N/A

70

42

168

N/A

N/A

/A

2008_
TF121T

(MA )

-=

0

/A

,J-(2010*3A]59RW£

Source: Judicial Statistics by Supreme Court (last updated Mar. 5, 2010)
The numbers in the table are approximate numbers reported by the Supreme Court
which may possibly be amended by additional reports in the future.
No data is available for numbers of newly filed cases and cases ending before 1995.
For 2002, the numbers of High Court cases do not include those cases filed in the
month of April.
All of the cases before the High Court are appeals of decisions rendered by the District
Court.
The High Court stopped keeping statistics on the number of actions filed in 2002.
From 1950 to 1992, the Supreme Court did not keep statistics on derivative actions.

68

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.1

APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
Results of Derivative Actions Filed
Results of Japanese derivative actions from 1993 to 2009

Total number
of derivative
actions with
result
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

148

27.027%

9.459%

16.216%

39.189%

8.108%

Total number
of derivative
actions with
both result
and exact
filing date
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

1993-1997

55

40.000%

5.455%

21.818%

21.818%

10.909%

1998-2001

44

13.636%

9.091%

22.727%

45.455%

9.091%

2002-2009

37

27.027%

5.405%

5.405%

56.757%

5.405%

Total

136

27.941%

6.618%

17.647%

38.971%

8.824%

Total number
of derivative
actions with
result
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"Jfor P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

30

66,667%

10.000%

0.000%

20.000%

3.333%

Total number
of derivative
actions with
both result
and exact
filing date
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
'Withdrawal"

1993-1997

15

73.333%

6.667%

0.000%

20.000%

0.000%

1998-2001

4

25.000%

25.000%

0.000%

50.000%

0.000%

2002-2009

9

77.778%

0.000%

0.000%

11.111%

11.111%

Total

28

67.857%

7.143%

0.000%

21.429%

3.571%

Overall

KO Cases

Overall
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TABLE 1
Results of Derivative Actions Filed (continued)

Non-KO Cases
Total
number of
derivative
actions with
result
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for F

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
'"Nithdrawal"

118

16.949%

9.322%

20.339%

44.068%

9.322%

Total
number of
derivative
actions with
both result
and exact
filing date
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

1993-1997

40

27.500%

5.000%

30.000%

22.500%

15.000%

1998-2001

40

12.500%

7.500"/o

25.000%

45.000%

10.000%

2002-2009

28

10.714%

7.143%

7.143%

71.429%

3.571%

Total

108

17.593%

6.481%

22.222%

43.519%

10.185%

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
'"Nithdrawal"

119

30.252%

5.042%

16.807%

41. 176%

6.723%

Total
number of
derivative
actions with
both result
and exact
filing date
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

1993-1997

44

45.455%

2.273%

22.727%

20.455%

9.091%

1998-2001

34

14.706%

8.824%

26.471%

44.118%

5.882%

2002-2009

34

26.471%

2.941%

2.941%

61.765%

5.882%

Total

112

30.357%

4.464%

17.857%

40.179%

7.143%

Overall

Listed Company Cases
Total
number of
derivative
actions with
result
information
Overall
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TABLE 1
Results of Derivative Actions Filed (continued)
Unlisted Company Cases
Total
number of
derivative
actions with
result
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

29

13.793%

27.586%

13.793%

31.034%

13.793%

Total
number of
derivative
actions with
both result
and exact
filing date
information

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Settlement"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for P"

Percentage
of derivative
actions with
result
"Dismissed"

Percentage
of
derivative
actions
with result
"J for D"

Percentage of
derivative
actions with
result
"Withdrawal"

1993-1997

11

18.182%

18.182%

18.182%

27.273%

18.182%

1998-2001

10

10.000%

10.000%

10.000%

50.000%

20.000%

2002-2009

3

33.333%

33.333%

33.333%

0.000%

0.000%

Total

24

16.667%

16.667%

16.667%

33.333%

16.667%

Overall

Source: DA Database. See supra note 123.
The year stated in the chart refers to the filing year
Twenty-six actions were excluded from the DA Database for this analysis as their
success/failure has yet to be determined
Twelve cases did not have an exact filing date and were therefore not included in the "subperiod" calculations
174 observations in the raw data in the DA Database
148 observations with results available
136 observations with results available and with a filing date for the sub-periods
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TABLE 2
Average Per-Share Recovery in Judgment for Plaintiff
(Listed Companies Only)
The Average Per-Share Recovery in J for P

Amount
Claimed

Amount
Recovery in J
for P

Shares
Outstanding

Per Share
Recover,

Stock
Price

Per
Share
evneryl
Stock
Price

Filing
Date

Result Date

%
Recovery
ofClcimed

(CORPORATION)

1011/1993

1212211994

100.00%

14,000,000

14,000.000

321,076,000

0.044

4150

OOD001

YAKULT
HONSHA CO
LTD

8/6/1998

12/16/2004

10.39%

65.000,000,000

6,754.000.000

175,910,000

38.395

1742

0.02204

MITSUBISHIOIL

2/2411999

412512002

2.00%

9.000.000,000

180,000,000

1.514,507,271

0119

204

0.00058

DUSION CO.,
LTD.

2003.4.4
and 20035-2

21212000

S0,40%

10.602,000.000

5,343,000,000

67,394,823

79.279

1754

0.04520

APAMANSHOP
HOLDINGSCO.,
LTD.

10/5/2006

1029/2008

9692%

130,000.000

126.000.000

1,033,822

121.878

2070

005888

Company Name

RAZAMA

Average Per Share Recoveryfor listed company nith .Jfor F result

47,943

Average Per Share RecoveryDivided by Stok Price

Source: DA Datmbe. See aupro cove 123.
There were 12observations in the DA Database that had an amount stated for recovery in cases where there was a J for P
6 ohservations were enlisted and 6 observationswere listed
We did net have access to the number of utstanding shares for unlisted companies andtherefore they were not included
The stock price date was retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Datestream Database

0,020P4
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TABLE 3
Average Per-Share Recovery in Settled Cases
(Listed Companies Only)
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2
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TABLE 4
Event Study on Stock Price Reaction
to Derivative Actions Filed
The stock price reaction to a derivative action being filed (from 1993-2006)
Average Abnormal Returns on Lawsuit Filing (86 lawsuits): Overall
Market-Adjusted
Day or Event Window
Return (%)
t
p-value

%positive

Day before lawsuit filed

-0.048

-0.155074

0.877131

46.51

Day lawsuit filed

0.258

1.137451

0.258546

50.00

Day after lawsuit filed

0.020

0.070510

0.943953

45.35

Day of suit and day after

0.278

0.656764

0.513107

44.19

Source: DA Database. See supra note 123.
This study follows West, Why ShareholdersSue, supra note 127, by using window [-300, -61], 240
trading days beginning 300 days before the event date for the estimation period.
This study applied the most commonly used market model.
The historical stock price data was retrieved from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP)
Database.
No statistically significant results were found.
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TABLE 5
Event Study on Stock Price Reaction
to Derivative Actions Settled
The stock price reaction to a settlement (overall/from 1993 to 1997/from 1998 to
2001/from 2002 to 2009)
Average Abnormal Returns on Settlement (17 lawsuits): Overall
MarketAdjusted
Day or Event Window
Return (%)
t
p-value
Day before the
settlement result
-0.312
-0.416962
0.682247
Day of settlement result
1.062
2.942200
0.009564
Day after the settlement
result
1.516
2.313597
0.034315
Two days after the
settlement result
-0.151
-0.218063
0.830137

% positive
35.29
76.47
58.82
58.82

CAR [-1,1]

2.266

1.788218

0.092692

58.82

CAR [0,21

2.427

2.551146

0.021354

64.71

Source: DA Database, see supra note 123.
This study follows West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 127, by using window [-300, -61],
240 trading days beginning 300 days before the event date for the estimation period.
This study used the most commonly used market model.
The historical stock price data was retrieved from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP)
Database.
The statistically significant results are highlighted in gray above.
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TABLE 6
Average Amount of Damages Claimed
(1993-2009)

For All Cases

166

Overall
For Successful Cases
("Settlement" or "J for
P")

24,193,793,976

24193.7940

1993 2009

12,321,352,642

12321.3526

8,895,053,077

8895.0531

13

3,095,864865

3095.8649

37

30,479,631,250

30479.6313

For "J for P" Cases
1993-2009

For Cases with KO
1993-2009

For Cases Without KO
1993 2009

Source: DA Database. See supra note 123.
174 observations in the DA Database.
166 observations specified an exact amount of damages claimed.
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TABLE 7
Average Amount of Settlement
KO vs. Non-KO
1' " " - . ' ,,,

!"( -:

', , ,, w ., ,

w

11,

\'

,

'.'

1' 1

lo

, ill, :' ii

, '

n -

Amount
Recovery if
Settled

Filing Date

Result Date

Amounts
Claimed

HAZAMA (CORPORATION)

10/1/1993

12/6/1996

30,000,000

45,000,000

OBAYASHI CORP

6/28/1994

1/27/1999

229,000,000

20,000,000

KAJIMA CORP

7/20/1994

12/20/2000

500,000,000

40,000,000

TAKASHIMAYA
NOMURA SECURITIES (three
suits)

8/16/1996

4/21/1997

160,000,000

170.000,000

5/2/1997

10/27/1998

880,000 000

380,000,000

AJINOMOTO CO. INC

7/15/1997

10/30/1998

120,000,000

120,000.000

GREEN CROSS
PENTA-OCEAN
CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD.

8/9/ 996

3/13/2002

24,000,000,000

100,000.000

8/14/2003

5/30/2010

222,000,000

88,000,000

KOBE STEEL, LTD.

6/27/2006

2/10/2010

200,000,000

88,000,000

HITACHI ZOSEN CORP.

3/22/2006

12/21/2009

800,000,000

200,000,000

SUMITOMO METAL
INDUSTRIES, LTD.

6/19/2006

3/30/2010

7,670,000,000

230,000,000

6/25/2008

6/1/2009

1,281 000,000

200,000,000

Company Name

OBAYASHI CORP.
A verage Am
ilount Claimed
with KO
Recovery\
Av elag Amit
,,ith1 KO

;, 0 07T,6 6667
140

,388ll
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TABLE 7 (continued)
Average Amount of Settlement
KO vs. Non-KO
KO vs. Non-KO: Percentage of the Average Amount of Settlement with All Observations
(continued)
Amount
Recovery if
Settled

Fiin, Dat

Result Dnte

Amounts
Claimed

COSMO SECURITIES

7/15/1994

4/7/2000

69,869,000,000

130,000,000

DAIWA BANK

11/27/1995

12/10/2001

110,000,000,000

250,000,000

SUMITOMO CORP

4/8/1997

3/15/2001

200,400,000,000

430,000,000

DAI-ICHI KANGYO BANK

7/16/1997

2/25/2000

1,000,000,000

127,000,000

HITACHI LTD

3/31/1998

12/21/1999

232,000,000

100,000,000

KOBE STEEL, LTD.

1/21/2000

4/5/2002

354,000,000

310,000,000

MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP.

3/12/2001

12/2/2003

1,177,000,000

180,000,000

TOKYO STYLE CO., LTD.

8/25/2003

10/17/2005

1,000,000,000

100,000,000

JAPAN AIRLINES

12/17/1999

5/17/2001

110,000,000

0

7/16/2009

320,000,000

60,000,000

Cnanv
.....

Name
n

N..
a m
. e..

..

.

.

NIPPON SHARYO

. ..

.

.

..

.. . ..

.

TOKYO SYOGIN

5/10/1995

1/23/2004

6,990,000,000

6,000,000,000

N/A

5/9/2000

4/19/2004

410,000,000

100,000,000

NIKKEI INC.
Average Amount Claimed
Without KO
Average Amount Recovery
Claim Without KO

6/4/2003

12/20/2004

9,420,000,000

20,000,000

Source: DA Database. See supra note 123.
174 observations in the DA Database.
Includes all actions with available settlement information.

30,867,846,154
600,538,462
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TABLE 8
Statistics in Actions Where the Court Orders
the Plaintiff to Post a Bond
The Percentage of Derivative Actions in Which the Court Ordered the
Plaintiff to Post a Bond

Overall

171

24

14.035%

Total

35

2

5.714%
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TABLE 8 (continued)
Statistics in Actions Where the Court Orders
the Plaintiff to Post a Bond

Total

116

18.966%
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TABLE 8 (continued)
Statistics in Actions Where the Court Orders
the Plaintiff to Post a Bond

I.

93

~

ZZ£

519 4

k

2
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TABLE 9
The Average Length of a Derivative Action
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to the
result date (130 observatioins)

For cases with bond order
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to the
result date (24 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to the
bond order date (24 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the bond order date
to the result date (24 obs)

For cases without bond order
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to the
result date (104 obs)
For different results: Settlement, J for P, Dismissed, J
for D, and Withdrawal
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to
settlement (36 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to J for
P (9 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to
Dismissed (24 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to J for
D (52 obs)
Average length (number of days) from the filing date to
Withdrawal (9 obs)

Source: DA Database, see supra note 123.
The table includes all listed and unlisted firms from the DA.
Database with required information available.

1058.18

865.67
339.71
525.96

1098.63

1207.33
1649.78
614.00
1151.12
517.56
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APPENDIX C
TABLE 1
Suggested Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to Post-1994 Fee Rules
Estimated

Estimated

Plaintiffs Damages

Retainer Fee

Success Fee

Up to Y3 million (about

8%

16%

5%

10%

$30,000)
V3 million (about $30,000) to
Y30 million (about $300,000)
Y30 million (about $300,000) to
Y300 million (about $3 million)
Over Y300 million (about $3
million)

6%
2%

4%

Source: Daini Tokyo Bar Association (http://niben.jp/consul/cost.html).
On April 1, 2004, the Fee Rules were abolished. However, even after 2004, the former
Fee Rules still normally provide the default terms for attorneys' fees in derivative
litigation (see table above).

